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A social navigation system collects data from its users—its community—about 
what they are doing, their opinions, and their decisions, aggregates this data, and 
provides the aggregated data—community data—back to individuals so that they 
can use it to guide behavior and decisions. Social navigation systems empower 
users with the ability to leverage social information on a much larger and faster 
scale than they can in the physical world. With social navigation systems, users 
can “see” what many, many other people have done without directly interacting 
with or observing them and can do so at a time when it is most beneficial to them. 
The popularity of social navigation systems indicates that both designers and 
users perceive value in them, but evaluations of social navigation systems yield 
surprising and mixed results. These findings suggest that while social navigation 
systems can lead users to good decisions and outcomes, they can also lead users 
to unexpected and potentially undesirable decisions and outcomes. In this thesis, 
I document my investigation of the user experience for social navigation systems 
that employ activity data. I define the social navigation user experience to be how 
users perceive, make sense of, and employ community data from social 
navigation systems.  
I make three main contributions in this thesis. First, I synthesize social 
navigation systems research with research in social influence, advice-taking, and 
informational cascades to construct hypotheses about the social navigation user 
experience. These hypotheses posit that community data from a social navigation 
system exerts informational influence on users, that users egocentrically discount 
community data, that herding in social navigation systems can be characterized 
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as informational cascades, and that the size and unanimity of the community 
data correspond to the strength of the community data’s influence.  
The second contribution of this thesis is an experiment that evaluates the 
hypotheses about the social navigation user experience; this experiment 
investigated how a social navigation system can support online charitable giving 
decisions. The experiment’s results support the majority of the hypotheses about 
the social navigation user experience and provide mixed evidence for the other 
hypotheses. The results show that the social navigation system’s community data 
exerted informational influence on participants and that the herding in social 
navigation systems can be characterized as informational cascades. The results 
suggest that participants egocentrically discounted community data; however, 
because the experiment was not designed to directly measure egocentric 
discounting, it is not possible to verify this hypothesis. The experiment’s results 
show that the unanimity of the community data is a significant factor in the effect 
that the community data has on participants’ decisions, but that the size of the 
community data was only significant in some instances. Finally, the results 
indicate that participants were skeptical of making a donation in general, and the 
community data was much more influential when reinforcing this skepticism as 
compared to overcoming it. 
The implications that arise from the experiment’s findings compromise the 
final contribution of this thesis. Broadly, these implications concern improving 
the design of social navigation systems and developing a general framework for 
evaluating the social influence of social navigation systems. The approach to 
improving social navigation systems is grounded in the development of methods 
to capture, aggregate, and represents objective information rather than actions or 
decisions. A general framework for evaluating the social influence of social 
navigation systems derives from the experimental design of the nonprofit choice 
3 
experiment; this framework standardizes the inputs, outputs, and analyzes for 
social navigation systems. The benefits of this framework include comparing 
social navigation systems within and across domains and comparing results from 
evaluations of social navigation experiments to results from experiments in social 





People are innately social creatures, and the ways in which people leverage 
social information to form opinions, guide behavior, and make decisions has 
been and continues to motivate many areas of research (Bandura, 1986; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991; Taylor, 2007). It is no surprise, then, that interactive computational 
systems have arisen to help people leverage social information; these systems are 
called social navigation systems (Höök, Benyon, & Munro, 2003). A social 
navigation system collects data from its users—its community—about what they 
are doing, their opinions, and their decisions, aggregates this data, and provides 
the aggregated data—community data—back to individuals so that they can use it 
to guide behavior and decisions. Social navigation systems empower users with 
the ability to leverage social information on a much larger and faster scale than 
they can in the physical world. With social navigation systems, users can “see” 
what many, many other people have done without directly interacting with or 
observing them and can do so at a time when it is most beneficial to them. 
Researchers have built systems that enable users to navigate socially in 
numerous domains; these domains include editing and reading documents (Hill, 
Hollan, Wroblewski, & McCandless, 1992), reading newsgroup messages 
(Resnick, Neophytos, Suchak, Bergstrom, & Riedl, 1994), exploring an online 
food recipe store (Svensson et al., 2001), browsing the Internet (Wexelblat & 
Maes, 1999), and finding citations for research papers (McNee, Kapoor, & 
Konstan, 2006). In addition, many highly popular websites use social navigation 
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systems either as a primary or complementary component of their site, including 
the online store Amazon1, the technology news and discussion website Slashdot2, 
and the websites for the news organizations CNN3, BBC4, and The New York 
Times5. 
The popularity of social navigation systems indicates that both designers and 
users perceive value in them, but evaluations of social navigation systems yield 
surprising and mixed results. Benefits of social navigation systems include 
helping users find items of interest more quickly (Wexelblat & Maes, 1999) and 
fostering awareness and social interaction among users that are employing the 
system at the same time (Svensson et al., 2001). However, social navigation 
systems can also produce suboptimal or undesirable results. In particular, 
herding behavior has been found to be a common problem in numerous social 
navigation systems (Cosley, Lam, Albert, Konstan, & Riedl, 2003; Goecks & 
Mynatt, 2005b; Lampe & Resnick, 2004; Svensson et al., 2001), and herding can 
lead users to behaviors and decisions that they later regret, find little value in, or 
find to be incorrect (Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006; Svensson et al., 2001). 
Instead of attesting to the value of social navigation systems, these findings 
suggest that a closer examination of these systems and their value to users is 
needed. Recent research has argued that focusing on user interfaces (Herlocker, 
Konstan, Terveen, & Riedl, 2004) and user tasks (McNee, Kapoor et al., 2006; 
McNee, Riedl, & Konstan, 2006b) are promising areas of research for improving 










social navigation systems. Nonetheless, a rigorous investigation of how users 
employ community data from social navigation systems has not been performed. 
Without such as investigation, it is difficult to understand how to improve user 
interfaces for social navigation systems, how to evaluate the efficacy of a social 
navigation system and how to compare multiple systems, and where and when to 
deploy social navigation systems to benefit users. 
These observations motivate this thesis. In this thesis, I document my 
investigation of the user experience for social navigation systems that employ 
activity data. I use the phrase user experience because it encompasses a wide 
range of potential interactions between users and a social navigation system’s 
community data. I define the social navigation user experience to be how users 
perceive, make sense of, and employ community data from social navigation 
systems. I largely limit my focus to social navigation systems that collect, 
aggregate, and display activity data—data about others’ behavior and decisions—
because activity data is the simplest form of community data and thus a logical 
starting point for studying the social navigation user experience. When a social 
navigation system collects and displays only activity data, users cannot interact 
with each other; this form of social navigation is called indirect social navigation, 
as compared to direct social navigation, where users can interact with each other 
(Dieberger et al., 2000). 
My investigation of the social navigation user experience began with efforts to 
understand its foundations. Dourish has argued “that social navigation is an 
interactive phenomenon rather than a class of technology....” (Dourish, 2003). I 
concur with this conceptualization of social navigation but generalize further; I 
argue that social navigation is a unique cognitive activity and a set of behaviors 
that occurs not only in social navigation systems but anytime individuals can 
observe others’ actions or decisions and use these observations when making 
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their own decisions. In fact, previous theorizing about social navigation draws 
parallels between socially-aided navigation in the physical world and what social 
navigation systems can facilitate in the digital world (Dieberger et al., 2000; 
Svensson et al., 2001). 
Because I consider social navigation to be a general cognitive activity and a set 
of behaviors that occurs not only online with the help of social navigation systems 
but also offline without help from technology, it beneficial to identify research 
that has studied offline behavior that is similar to social navigation and use this 
research to ground and foster investigation of the social navigation user 
experience. This is the approach that I employ in my thesis. 
I have performed an extensive review of behavioral and social science research 
and identified three bodies of research that bear strong similarities to social 
navigation systems: social influence (Bond & Smith, 1996), advice-taking 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), and informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Welch, 1992). I argue that these three 
bodies of research should undergird a understanding of the social navigation user 
experience because they provide knowledge about how people behave and make 
decisions in situations that are nearly identical to those that users of social 
navigation systems encounter. In brief, the situation common to these three 
bodies of research and social navigation systems is as follows: an individual 
encounters a decision to be made and can see what other people have decided 
before him; the natural behavior in this situation is to use the choices of others as 
well as any personal information he has to make a decision. The opportunity to 
see what others have chosen before making a decision is the key feature of this 
situation and, notably, is the principal function of a social navigation system. 
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Research in social influence, advice-taking, and informational cascades clearly 
demonstrates that the opportunity to see what others have done before making a 
decision often profoundly influences the decision. In all bodies of research, 
individuals often make choices that are the same as or quite similar to the choices 
that others have made, oftentimes ignoring information that suggests a different 
choice. However, each body of research contributes a unique perspective on how 
individuals employ and are influenced by observing others’ decisions. Social 
influence research indicates that there are two types of social influence, 
normative social influence and informational social influence, and numerous 
factors impact the type of social influence that occurs in a given instance. Advice-
taking research shows that individuals use many techniques to weigh others’ 
decisions and arrive at a final decision based on both their own and others’ 
decisions. Finally, informational cascades research shows that many sub-optimal 
outcomes occur when social influence is amplified or unchecked. 
My thesis statement discusses how I leverage these bodies of research toward 
the advancement of social navigation systems. 
1.1 Thesis Statement 
Understanding the social navigation user experience—how users 
perceive, make sense of, and employ community data from social 
navigation systems—for systems that employ activity data can be 
accomplished by employing a multidisciplinary perspective. This 
perspective—driven by research in social navigation systems, social 
influence, advice-taking, and informational cascades—predicts that (a) 
community data from a social navigation system exerts informational 
influence; (b) herding in social navigation systems can be characterized 
as informational cascades; (c) users ego-centrically discount 
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community data; and (d) the size and unanimity of community data 
correlate with the impact of community data on decision making. 
1.2 Contributions 
There are three main contributions that derive from this thesis statement. 
First, I synthesize social navigation systems research with research in social 
influence, advice-taking, and informational cascades to construct hypotheses 
about the social navigation user experience. Second, I empirically evaluate these 
hypotheses via an experiment and thereby develop a robust understanding of the 
social navigation user experience. Finally, I discuss how an understanding of the 
social navigation user experience can inform and improve the design, 
deployment, and evaluation of social navigation systems. I discuss each of these 
contributions in turn. 
My first contribution is a set of five hypotheses about the social navigation user 
experience. To derive hypotheses about the social navigation user experience, I 
applied each perspective—social influence, advice-taking, and informational 
cascades—in order to understand how users might experience community data 
from a social navigation system.  
The principal hypotheses that drive the thesis statement arise from a social 
influence and informational cascades perspective. There are two types of social 
influence, informational influence and normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1965). Informational influence occurs when an individual employs community 
data as a source of information, and normative influence occurs when an 
individual employs community data as a source of social standards. Both types of 
influence guide both tacit and explicit choices; however, each type arises from 
unique motivations and thought processes that can lead to different choices in 
the same context. The hypothesis that derives from a social influence perspective 
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states that community data exerts informational influence rather than normative 
influence on users.  
The hypothesis that derives from an informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992) lens predicts that herding in social 
navigation systems arises due to informational influence rather than normative 
influence. This hypothesis states that when users interpret community data as a 
source of information, they may sometimes ignore their own information and 
make the choice that matches the community consensus. (The community 
consensus is clear from the community data.) When this occurs, the herding in 
social navigation systems are informational cascades. Informational cascades, 
then, are driven by informational influence. Cascades arise when an individual 
infers information from others’ choices and uses the inferred information to 
guide his choice; such inferences often lead to herding. Conversely, herding 
driven by normative influence is simpler; in this type of herding, individuals herd 
to derive the benefits of conforming to social conventions or to avoid the 
consequences of nonconformity. 
Three additional hypotheses arise from this multidisciplinary perspective on 
the social navigation user experience. The hypothesis that derives from an advice-
taking perspective predicts that users value their initial choice more highly than 
they do others’ choices. Because a system’s community data represents others’ 
choices, an individual using a social navigation system reaches a final decision by 
combining his initial choice with others’ choices. I hypothesize that his final 
choice will be closer to his initial choice than to others’ choices. This 
phenomenon—discounting others’ decisions in relation to one’s own—is termed 
ego-centric discounting, and it is one of the most robust findings in the advice-
taking literature (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).  
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My final two hypotheses concern the size and unanimity of the community 
data. The community data’s size is the number of people whose data is 
represented, and the community data’s unanimity is the unanimity in the data. I 
hypothesize that both the size and unanimity of community data correlates with 
its impact on users’ decisions. A community data’s size and unanimity are 
common factors in the bodies of research that drive my analysis of the social 
navigation user experience. 
My second contribution is the design and completion of an experiment that 
evaluates these hypotheses by studying user decision making for the nonprofit 
giving domain. In the experiment, participants are asked to place themselves in 
the role of potential donors and make a series of decisions regarding whether 
they would make a donation to different nonprofit organizations. For each 
nonprofit that a participant is asked to make a decision for, she is provided with 
two types of data, private information about the organization’s efficiency and 
community data from a social navigation system. The experiment’s structure 
employs techniques from informational influence experiments (Baron, Vandello, 
& Brunsman, 1996; Deutsch & Gerard, 1965) and informational cascades 
experiments (Anderson & Holt, 1997, 2006). Results from this experiment 
validate my two principal hypotheses, provide mixed evidence for my other three 
hypotheses, and yield surprising insight into the unequal impact of community 
data based on decision biases. 
The final contribution applies the knowledge gained from this experiment to 
the design, deployment, and evaluation of social navigation systems. I apply 
knowledge about the social navigation user experience to the development of 
novel user interface techniques for social navigation systems that mitigate 
informational cascades, which often leads users to suboptimal decisions and can 
produce significant negative consequences.  
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Knowledge of the social navigation user experience can also provide guidance 
about the domains in which social navigation is likely to be most useful. 
Currently, there is little guidance beyond case studies about the utility of social 
navigation systems in different domains. However, knowledge of the social 
navigation user experience suggests that domain-specific factors such as 
knowledge distribution, decision biases, and incentive structures are likely to 
contribute to the success or failure of a social navigation system.  
Finally, I also discuss how the experimental design and analysis employed in 
this thesis can serve as a general method for evaluating social navigation systems 
regardless of the domain. This experimental approach produces data that is 
system and domain-agnostic and thus can be used to compare systems in the 
same domain or systems in different domains.  
1.3 Thesis Organization 
The organization of this thesis parallels the thesis statement and contributions. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 develop a foundation for understanding the social navigation 
user experience. Chapter 2 reviews previous research on social navigation 
systems from a user-centered perspective and identifies four challenges that arise 
from this perspective: (a) creating systems that support the canonical activity in 
social navigation, decision making or, specifically, selecting from amongst a set of 
choices; (b) understanding the social navigation user experience—how users 
perceive, make sense of, and employ community data; and (c) evaluating the 
efficacy of social navigation systems. 
Chapter 3 argues that herding behavior in social navigation systems can 
provide a window into the social navigation user experience. This chapter 
discusses instances of herding behavior in several different social navigation 
systems and the consequences of herding. The chapter concludes by identifying 
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key questions about herding and about the social navigation user experience, and 
these questions serve to ground the discussion in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 engages 
the social navigation experience on a theoretical level. In this chapter, I 
synthesize research in social navigation systems with research in social influence, 
advice-taking, and informational cascades to develop broad hypotheses about the 
social navigation user experience. 
In Chapter 5, I reflect on social navigation systems that I developed for end-
user privacy and end-user security management through the lens of the social 
navigation user experience. This lens provides insight into the successes and 
failures of each system and how similar systems might be improved. A central 
focus in this chapter is the prevention of informational cascades in social 
navigation systems applied to end-user privacy and security management. 
Chapters 6 and 7 describe and discuss results from the nonprofit choice 
experiment, an experiment to operationalizes and evaluate my hypotheses about 
the social navigation user experience. Chapter 6 describes the experiment design 
in great detail. Particular focus is paid to the conditions in the experiment and 
how decision data from the conditions can yield insight into critical decisions. 
The chapter concludes with a full list of hypotheses for the experiment. Chapter 7 
reports the results of the experiment and evaluates each hypothesis based on 
experimental data. 
Chapters 8 and 9 apply and reflect on the knowledge of the social navigation 
user experience gained in the preceding chapters. Chapter 8 argues that, in 
particular domains, social navigation systems can be improved by focusing on the 
capture, aggregation, and representation of objective information rather than 
actions or decisions. Chapter 8 also discusses a general evaluation method for 
social navigation systems. Chapter 9 reflects back on the thesis as a whole. This 
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chapter discusses the contributions of this thesis and future work that can be 
explored as a result of the findings in this thesis. Chapter 9 and the thesis 
conclude by arguing for the mindful use of social navigation systems. The 
research in this dissertation shows that social navigation systems are not neutral 
technologies—they promote some behaviors and choices and mitigate others—
and hence it may be useful to make the desired goals of a social navigation system 
explicit and consider how best to employ a system to achieve those goals.
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CHAPTER 2  
 A USER-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL 
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 
 
Dourish and Chalmers introduced the concept of social navigation while 
discussing methods for navigating information spaces (Dourish & Chalmers, 
1994). In this nascent conception, individuals navigating socially move through 
an informational space based on markers generated by other people’s activities. 
Social navigation, then, differs markedly from navigating a space based on 
physical or informational markers. Social navigation systems support the activity 
of social navigation by enabling a user to see what other people have been doing 
or saying by automatically capturing, aggregating, and displaying the behavior 
and activities of its community of users (Höök et al., 2003). For example, a social 
navigation system might highlight “paths” that lead to popular webpages about a 
particular subject, highly rated posts in a discussion forum, frequently 
downloaded food recipes from an online cookbook, or recommendations for 
songs that an individual may be interested in purchasing from a music store. 
Researchers have built systems that enable users to navigate socially in 
numerous domains; these domains include editing and reading documents (Hill 
et al., 1992), reading newsgroup messages (Resnick et al., 1994), exploring an 
online food recipe store (Svensson et al., 2001), browsing the Internet (Wexelblat 
& Maes, 1999), navigating online educational lectures (Mertens, Farzan, & 
Brusilovsky, 2006), collaborating around information visualizations (Heer, 
Viegas, & Wattenberg, 2008), and finding citations for research papers (McNee, 
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Kapoor et al., 2006). In addition, many highly popular websites use social 
navigation systems either as a primary or complementary component of their 
site, including the online store Amazon6, the technology news and discussion 
website Slashdot7, and the websites for the news organizations CNN, BBC, and 
The New York Times. Figure 2.1 shows a number of commercial social navigation 
systems. 







Figure 2.1. Examples of social navigation systems. Clockwise from top-left: (a) Digg, 
a website where users can vote on (“digg”) and discuss stories; stories are displayed 
based on the number of diggs that they receive. (b) The Alexa web toolbar, which 
displays information about the popularity of a website a user is visiting. (c) The 
Amazon website, which employs many different forms of social navigation, including 
recommendations, lists of most popular items, and item ratings and comments. (d) A 
list of the most popular stories on The New York Times website.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to analyze past research in social navigation 
systems research from a user-centered perspective. I discuss the activities for 
which users employ social navigation systems and the domains that social 
navigation systems have been utilized in. I also discuss past research that has 
endeavored to measure the efficacy of social navigation systems; I focus on 
relating the three basic components of a social navigation system—input, 
aggregation algorithm, and output—to the impact that a system has on users. 
Based on these discussions, I identify a unique subset of challenges for employing 
social navigation systems, and these challenges drive the investigation of the 
social navigation user experience. In brief, these challenges are: 
1. using social navigation systems to support decision making; 
2. understanding how users employ data from social navigation systems; 
3. evaluating how well social navigation systems meet users’ needs. 
Before proceeding further, it is useful to define the terms community and 
community data as they relate to social navigation systems; I use these terms 
extensively in the remainder of this dissertation. I define the term community to 
mean the set of users who utilize and contribute data to a social navigation 
system, and community data is the aggregated user data that a system presents 
for use in social navigation. I use the term community data rather than 
community information in order to draw a clear distinction between the data 
that a system provides and the information that users interpret from that data. 
This distinction is a focus of this thesis. 
19 
2.1 Social Navigation Activities 
An initial step toward the development a user-centered perspective on social 
navigation systems is identifying and discussing the activities that users engage 
in when they navigate socially.  
I argue that three general activities comprise social navigation (Goecks & 
Mynatt, 2005a). These activities are (1) becoming aware of a choice or an 
available path; (2) seeking information about particular choices and paths; and 
(3) weighing available information—oftentimes community data—and making an 
informed decision. Taken together, I argue that social navigation is the repeated 
execution of the three activities above while maintaining awareness of others’ 
activities and using the information derived from such awareness to guide each 
activity. This conceptualization of social navigation is quite similar to that 
proposed in (Riedl & St. Amant, 2003). 
Now consider how social navigation systems support each of the three 
activities that comprise social navigation. First, a social navigation system may 
help individuals navigate a large information space by filtering or ranking items 
based on community data; collaborative filtering systems [e.g. (Goldberg, 
Nichols, Oki, & Terry, 1992; Resnick et al., 1994) ] and Internet search engines 
[e.g. Google8 and Alexa9] use community data to filter and rank order items. Lists 
of most popular webpages or forum posts, most purchased items, or 
recommended products are example outputs from social navigation systems that 
filter and rank items in order to help users’ awareness of particular items. 
                                                   
 
 
8 http://www.google.com, see (Page, Brin, Motwani, & Winograd, 1998) for a description of how the 
Google search engine leverages community data. 
9 http://www.alexa.com 
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Alternatively, a social navigation system may, based on others’ actions, 
highlight particularly useful or salient information so that it draws users’ 
attention. Harrison and Dourish’s “space to place” model articulates this 
approach (Harrison & Dourish, 1996); in this model, users transform or augment 
a space via their actions, turning it into a place. The transformations and 
augmentations that users enact on a space provide evidence of how others have 
interacted and utilized the space towards individual and shared goals. Websites 
(Svensson et al., 2001) and discussion spaces (Viegas & Donath, 1999) often use 
this approach. As with filtering, raising awareness is the principle user activity 
that the “space to place” model supports. 
Finally, a social navigation system may endeavor to directly support decision 
making. Reputation systems (Resnick, Kuwabara, Zeckhauser, & Friedman, 
2000) are an example of a decision support systems. Reputation systems collect 
and make visible community feedback about interactions (often transactions) 
with an individual (or company) has made in the community, and the feedback 
serves as the individual’s reputation. When an individual considers interacting 
(e.g. buying an item) from another person, he can use the person’s reputation as 
information to help him decide whether he wants to interacting with that person. 
2.2 Decision Making as the Principal Social Navigation Activity 
A closer examination of the three activities that comprise social navigation 
suggests that they are, in fact, all in service of decision making. When a system 
filters, ranks, or highlights items, it is helping users direct their attention to 
particular items and, ideally, helping users identify a subset of items from which 
they will make their final selection. Thus, the purpose of a social navigation 
system is to help users make decisions that will culminate in the selection of an 
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item; of course, the selection of an item is clearly the most salient decision that a 
user makes. 
Other analyses also suggest that decision making is a central activity of social 
navigation. Wexelblat and Maes have argued that the kind(s) of information 
provided by a social navigation system—what has been done, who has done it, 
why they did it, and how they did it—can support particular user tasks (Wexelblat 
& Maes, 1999). The majority of social navigation systems provide mostly or 
exclusively what information (e.g. ratings, lists of most read, listened to, or 
download items) because it is easy to collect, aggregate, and display, and 
Wexelblat and Maes argue that what information best supports information 
seeking and “guidance support” or decision making. Dourish concurs that within 
the context of social navigation, the term ‘navigation’ is best understood to be an 
information-seeking activity (Dourish, 2003). Finally, Gintis has argued that the 
brain is best understood to be a decision-making organ, and that many human 
activities—including information seeking—can be conceptualized as deciding 
between or selecting actions to perform (Gintis, 2007). 
Of course, information seeking and decision making are often closely related. 
When seeking information, users repeatedly make decisions about where to look 
next and whether to read an item in depth. In addition, decision making often 
motivates information seeking because information sought is frequently used to 
make a decision. Ultimately, I argue that decision making is a more useful focal 
activity than information seeking because decision making more often drives 
information seeking. 
Based on this discussion, I argue that decision making is the principal activity 
that users engage in during social navigation. Thus, one challenge that I address 
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in this thesis is bringing a decision-making perspective to bear on social 
navigation systems. 
2.3 Social Navigation System Components and their Relation to 
Decision Making 
Three principal components comprise a social navigation system: input data, 
algorithms for data aggregation, and the display and use of the aggregated 
community data. I discuss each of these components, highlighting the advantages 
and disadvantages of choices for each component and the relationships between 
choices and the activities and domains to which a system is applied. 
2.3.1 Input Data 
The input to a social navigation system is the raw data that the system collects. 
Input data for a social navigation system can be of multiple types; the most 
common types are activity data, ratings, and free text. Examples of activity data 
for a shopping website include articles read, hyperlinks clicked on, and items 
purchased. Individuals generate activity data as a byproduct of performing 
actions, and the system records this data by instrumenting digital environments 
to record actions taken. Many systems enable individuals to actively rate items 
(Resnick et al., 1994), transactions (Resnick et al., 2000), or even people 
(Terveen & McDonald, 2005). Other social navigation systems enable users to 
submit free text, often in addition to activity data and ratings; free text is often 
used to capture comments and conversations about an object (or item or person). 
Table 2.1 provides an analysis of these three input data types and tagging 
(discussed below) along four dimensions: (1) implicit or explicit data collection; 
(2) user burden; (3) ease of aggregation; and (4) information expressiveness. 
Users generate activity data as a result of their normal actions, and hence activity 
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data is collected as an implicit byproduct of those actions. In contrast, users must 
take intentional action to generate explicit data; examples of explicit data include 
rating an item and typing a comment. Some data types impose a higher burden 
on users than others. Implicit data imposes a low burden on users, but explicit 
data imposes a higher burden on users. Moreover, different forms of explicit data 
are more burdensome than others; rating an item takes less effort than writing a 
review of the item. Most data types are amenable to aggregation because one 
datum can be compared to another, but there is a notable exception: free text is 
not easily aggregated. 
Finally, data types differ markedly in their capacity to express information. 
Activity data has limited expressiveness because it conveys little information. 
Activity data shows what actions were performed, but not why they were 
performed; hence an individual must infer the motivations behind activity data. 
This inference process can be quite difficult because many social navigation 
systems provide relatively little context or additional information from which an 
individual might make better inferences. Explicit data is more expressive than 
implicit data because it often explains why a particular action was taken. An 
important observation is that the burden placed on a user during the generation 
of data closely correlates with information content; the more effort required to 
create the data, the more expressive—and likely more useful—the data will be.  
A type of input data for social navigation systems that is becoming increasingly 
popular is tagging. Tagging is the practice of applying multiple, short words or 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of community data types for social navigation systems. 
 Data Collection User Burden Aggregation Expressiveness 
Activity Data Implicit Low Easy Low 
Ratings Explicit Moderate Easy Moderate 
Free Text Explicit High Hard High 
Tagging Explicit Moderate Moderate Moderate-High 
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phrases to describe an item; each word or phrase is an independent tag that 
describes the item. Tags are free text, but are amenable to aggregation because 
they are short and can be easily compared. Individuals may tag items so that they 
can find them easily in the future, and tagging systems may aggregate individual 
tags to facilitate the goals discussed in the previous section, especially filtering, 
searching and navigating a collection of objects (Dourish et al., 2000; Marlow, 
Naaman, boyd, & Davis, 2006; Shilad et al., 2006). Popular tagging systems 
include del.icio.us10, a bookmark tagging system, and Flickr11, a photo tagging 
system. Tagging is a potential “sweet spot” among input data types. Tagging is an 
explicit data type that imposes a low burden on users, is easily aggregated, and 
has moderately high expressivity. Thus, tagging balances the typical tradeoff 
between user burden and expressivity better than other data types. 
In this thesis, I focus on analyzing and understanding the user experience for 
social navigation systems that employ only activity data. I limit my focus to 
systems that employ activity data for multiple reasons. Systems that employ 
activity data are the simplest form of social navigation system and thus quite 
amenable to study. In addition, there is very little understanding of the social 
navigation user experience for these systems. Because systems that employ 
activity data are simple and unstudied from a user experience perspective, they 
are an excellent subject for investigation. 
2.3.2 Aggregation Algorithms 
Most social navigation systems aggregate input data and present a 
summarization of the aggregation as community data. Aggregation is the process 






by which a social navigation system includes, excludes, and weights input data to 
generate community data. Aggregating input data is useful because users rarely 
want to look at each individual datum, and aggregation obviates this problem by 
presenting a summarization that encompasses multiple data points. For example, 
users may want to view data about a particular item or view data generated 
during a particular time period. Aggregation is independent of data type; if a data 
type can be aggregated (i.e. can be compared), any aggregation method can be 
applied to the data. 
A key aggregation challenge for social navigation systems is selecting a group 
of users from which to draw data for aggregation. Most aggregation algorithms 
have the following structure: 
1. identify a group of selected users from the community; 
2. weight selected users based on a criterion; 
3. average weights from selected users. 
Thus, there are two dimensions along which aggregation algorithms can vary. 
First, different algorithms can select different users; second, different algorithms 
can weight users differently. At opposite ends of these dimensions are the two 
very popular aggregation algorithms equal-weight, inclusive aggregation [e.g. 
(Goecks & Mynatt, 2005b; Wexelblat & Maes, 1999)] and collaborative filtering 
(Resnick et al., 1994). The equal-weight inclusive aggregation (EI) algorithm 
includes all data from all users and weights all data equally. In contrast, a 
collaborative filtering (CF) algorithm personalizes the aggregation result to an 
individual by selecting a set of neighbors that are similar to an individual and 
weighting data from each neighbor based on how similar the neighbor is to the 
individual. 
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There is limited research on the value that users find in aggregation 
algorithms. Cosley et al. have verified this assumption, showing that users 
expressed more satisfaction when a recommendation system provided accurate 
ratings as compared to when it provided inaccurate ratings (Cosley et al., 2003). 
Senecal and Nantel have studied the impact of a recommendation system on 
users’ decisions; they demonstrate that users select products significantly more 
often when they are recommended by a system and that recommendations 
assumed to be from a personalized recommendation system were more 
influential than recommendation from an EI system or from a group of experts 
(Senecal & Nantel, 2004). Still, there are many questions that remain 
unanswered, such as how and why a recommendation system influences users’ 
selections and whether the influence leads user to better decisions.  
2.3.3 User Interfaces for Social Navigation and the Efficacy of Social 
Navigation Systems 
Given the popularity of social navigation systems, it is surprising that there is 
relatively little research regarding the effectiveness of various user interfaces for 
presenting community data and the overall efficacy of social navigation systems. 
These topics are closely connected and often overlap, and hence I discuss them 
together. Much of the research discussed concerns recommender systems 
because they are the dominant type of social navigation system; nonetheless, the 
research is applicable to other systems as well. 
Recommender system researchers have argued that focusing on users and user 
interfaces is a promising area for improving recommendation systems (Herlocker 
et al., 2004; McNee, Kapoor et al., 2006). Early work in recommender system 
interfaces found that explaining recommendations from recommender systems 
increased user acceptance and may aid decision making (Herlocker, Konstan, & 
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Riedl, 2000). Another investigation of recommender systems studied how a user 
interface impacted user input to a social navigation system and found that (a) 
rating systems did not change users’ ratings for items and (b) showing the 
system’s recommended rating for items did influence users’ ratings. The authors 
argued that this latter finding is the result of social conformity (Cosley et al., 
2003). 
Recent research by (McNee, Riedl et al., 2006b) has yielded a Human-
Recommender Interaction (HRI) framework; this framework provides a 
taxonomy for understanding users of recommender systems, their goals, and 
their tasks; a contribution of this work is the proposed mapping from users to 
evaluation metrics, some of which are focused on the user interface. One outcome 
of this framework is the dependency between recommendation algorithm and 
user task: the efficacy of recommendation algorithms can be dependent on the 
tasks that a user is performing (McNee, Kapoor et al., 2006). The HRI framework 
hints at a fundamental question regarding social navigation: how effective are 
social navigation systems at helping users and how can systems’ efficacy be 
measured and compared? This question has been largely overlooked in the 
evaluation of recommender systems (Herlocker et al., 2004). 
One challenge in evaluating the efficacy of social navigation systems is that 
influence of others’ action and behaviors is both a fundamental and tacit activity 
(Bandura, 1977)12. Because of these characteristics and likely many other factors, 
more time has been spent building and improving social navigation systems than 
understanding how users employ community data. This thesis endeavors to 
                                                   
 
 
12 Interestingly, this behavior is not uniquely human; many other animals gauge their behavior based on 
observations of others (Bennett & Giraldeau, 2001). 
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address this shortcoming in social navigation systems research. I define the social 
navigation user experience to be how users perceive, make sense of, and employ 
community data from social navigation systems. The goal of this thesis is to 
develop an understanding of the social navigation user experience and hence 
better understand the efficacy of social navigation systems. 
There has limited effort to understand the social navigation user experience. 
As noted above, research shows that social navigation systems do exert influence 
on users, causing them to choose items at a higher rate than they otherwise 
would (Chen, 2008; Senecal & Nantel, 2004) and rate items more closely to the 
community’s rating than they otherwise would (Cosley et al., 2003). It is unclear 
why social navigation systems exert influence over users’ decisions and whether 
this influence is desirable. Another study of a social navigation system found that 
users can search the Internet more quickly using a social navigation system than 
they otherwise could, but it is unclear how a system confers this benefit 
(Wexelblat & Maes, 1999). A subjective assessment of a social navigation system 
found that users enjoy the social affordances of a social navigation system, such 
as seeing what others are doing and knowing that other people are present 
(Svensson et al., 2001).  
Clearly, then, two final challenges in employing a user-centered perspective 
for social navigation are (1) understanding the social navigation user 
experience and (2) measuring the efficacy of social navigation systems. 
2.4 Challenges in Employing a User-Centered Perspective for Social 
Navigation Systems 
I have argued that there are three challenges that arise from a user-centered 
perspective on social navigation systems: 
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1. creating systems that support the canonical activity in social navigation, 
decision making; 
2. understanding the social navigation user experience—how users 
perceive, make sense of, and employ community data; 
3. evaluating the efficacy of social navigation systems. 
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CHAPTER 3  
HERDING IN SOCIAL NAVIGATION SYTEMS: A WINDOW 
INTO THE SOCIAL NAVIGATION USER EXPERIENCE 
 
Chapter 2 identifies a shortcoming in social navigation systems research: there 
is limited research of the social navigation user experience. Given this dearth of 
research, it is surprising that there are many observations of herding behavior in 
social navigation systems (Cosley et al., 2003; Goecks & Mynatt, 2005b; Lampe & 
Resnick, 2004; Salganik et al., 2006; Svensson et al., 2001). When an individual 
engages in herd behavior, he makes a decision that is the same as the community 
consensus. 
Herding is a useful probe for better understanding the social navigation for a 
variety of reasons. Herding is a striking finding, whether it occurs in a physical or 
digital space, and as such herding prompts reflection on the social navigation 
user experience in order to better understand why herding might have happened. 
Herding also prompts reflection on the efficacy and utility of social navigation 
systems. Previous research of social navigation systems has argued that social 
navigation systems, by virtue of providing community data, are useful (Dieberger 
et al., 2000; Resnick et al., 1994). Herding calls this argument into question 
because herding in a social navigation system homogenizes the choices made by a 
community of users; in general, such strong homogeneity in choices may be 
problematic if the predominant choice is wrong or harmful to a large number 
number of users. Thus, in order to determine whether and when to mitigate 
herding, it is necessary to understand herding; in the process of understanding 
herding, there is the opportunity—and perhaps necessity—to investigate the 
social navigation user experience as well. 
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This chapter discusses instances of herding in social navigation systems and 
concludes with a set of questions that herding raises about the social navigation 
user experience and the efficacy of social navigation systems. 
3.1 Herding in a Social Navigation System for an Online Food & 
Recipe Store 
Svensson et al. observed herding in Kalas, a social navigation system that 
helped users navigate an online food store (Svensson, Höök, & Cöster, 2005; 
Svensson et al., 2001). In addition to basic navigational and searching 
functionality, Kalas enabled social navigation in numerous ways. Users could rate 
recipes, obtain recommendations for recipes, see what recipes others have rated 
highly and which areas other users were spending time in, and talk with other 
users about recipes. In reflecting on usage data and user interviews for Kalas, 
Svensson et al. reported that was necessary “to watch out for the snowball effect 
where the social trails lead more and more users down a path they do not 
perceive valuable in the long run” (Svensson et al., 2001). The ‘snowball effect’ is 
an instance of herding, and the ‘social trails’ that they refer to are simple 
indicators that show what recipe areas others are visiting. Finally, Svensson et al. 
argue that herding may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users. 
Svensson et al. argue that there are two approaches to mitigating herding. 
First, they argue for employing a recommendation system to provide more 
personalized recommendations; however, as discussed below, recommendation 
systems are also subject to herding. Second, they argue that segmenting users 
into groups such as chefs and friends will enable users to choose which group 
they follow. This approach requires overcoming unequal benefits of participation 
among different user groups and achieving critical mass for each group (Grudin, 
1994). Both of these solutions advocate providing more information to users, 
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either in the form of recommendations that are more tuned to individual 
preferences or by indicating the group that produced the social trail. 
3.2 Herding in Moderation of Online Discussion Forums 
Lampe and Resnick have studied community moderation in an online 
discussion forum (Lampe & Resnick, 2004). In the moderation system that they 
studied, individuals can increase or decrease a post’s moderation score 
depending on its contribution, and users can filter forums based on moderation 
scores so that they read only posts that are moderated highly. Thus, community 
moderation serves as a form of social navigation.  
Lampe and Resnick observed herding behavior in moderation activities, and 
herding can either increase or decrease a post’s moderation score. Not 
surprisingly, corrections to herding are more likely to occur for messages with 
high visibility (i.e. messages incorrectly moderated high) than those with low 
visibility (i.e. messages incorrectly moderated low). Hence, “[herding] could 
result in buried treasures, comments that should have high scores but do not.” As 
in other social navigation systems, then, herding can lead to undesirable 
outcomes.  
3.3 Herding in a Recommender System 
Cosley et al. found evidence of herding in a recommender system (Cosley et al., 
2003). Cosley et al. found that when users are asked to re-rank a movie and are 
also shown the recommender system’s prediction for the movie, their rank tends 
toward the predicted rating. Because recommender system portray their 
predicted level of interest as community data and because users’ re-rankings 
gravitate toward the community data, Cosley et al. argue that this finding is 
indicative of a recommender system exerting social influence on users. This is an 
important finding because it demonstrates that herding can occur irrespective of 
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the aggregation algorithm that a social navigation system employs. Thus, herding 
behavior is a challenge for social navigation systems that employ simple 
aggregation algorithms, such as counting, and for social navigation systems that 
use complex aggregation algorithms such as collaborative filtering (Resnick et al., 
1994). 
Cosley et al. also observed that users expressed dissatisfaction with poor 
predictions, and they argue that this is an indication that users recognize 
manipulated predictions—predictions that arise from users whose ratings are 
made in order to exert social influence—because they are poor. However, a 
contradiction arises in these results: even if users recognized poor or 
manipulated predictions, they nonetheless conformed to them. An alternative 
explanation is that users’ negative reaction to poor rankings is independent of 
their recognition of manipulated predictions. 
I concur with Cosley et al.’s core finding—that herding is present in 
recommendation systems—but argue that there is much more to be learned why 
social navigation systems cause herding.  
3.4 Herding on the Internet and the World Wide Web 
The World Wide Web (WWW) is an interconnected hyperlink network with a 
primary purpose of sharing information; hence, it is reasonable to argue that the 
WWW is a slow, messy social navigation system. There is ample evidence to 
indicate that herding frequently arises in the WWW hyperlink network. A telltale 
indicator of herding in (semi-) random networks is a power-law distribution 
(Watts, 2002). In power law distributions, the most popular items are 
exponentially more popular than other items—even other items that are just a 
little less popular (Newman, 2005).  Because the WWW is a semi-random 
network, power-law distributions provide evidence of herding. The connection 
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between power laws and herding is straightforward: items often become 
exponentially popular not because their inherent qualities make them 
exponentially more desirable but because cascades markedly increase an item’s 
popularity. 
The WWW’s hyperlink, growth, and traffic all obey power law distributions 
(Adamic & Huberman, 2000; Huberman, 2001; Huberman & Adamic, 1999). For 
example, the number of hyperlinks to the Nth most popular website is only about 
1/N the number of hyperlinks to the most popular website. Because search 
engines use the number of links to a website as a ranking mechanism (Page et al., 
1998), the expectation is that the most popular websites for a topic often 
maintain and grow their popularity. Of course, growing popularity leads to more 
hyperlinks to the website, and herding that arises from the website’s popularity 
begets additional herding. Even among groups of bloggers, hyperlink popularity 
frequently obeys a power law distribution and is likely fueled by herding (Kumar, 
Novak, Raghaven, & Tomkins, 2003). Finally, there is also evidence that the 
distribution of edits to Wikipedia articles obeys a power law distribution and a 
contributing factor of edit distribution is the visibility of articles (Wilkinson & 
Huberman, 2007); this evidence suggests that Wikipedia edits are subject to 
herding as well. 
3.5 Herding on a Music Download Site 
Salganik et al. have found that herding within a social navigation system 
profoundly impacts the popularity of songs on a music download site (Salganik et 
al., 2006). Salganik et al. studied download rates of songs across multiple music 
download sites. There were three categories of sites: (a) a control site with no 
social navigation system; (b) a site with a simple social navigation system that 
showed download counts for songs but did not sort songs based on download 
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counts; and (c) a site that organized songs by download count. Each site was 
populated with the same songs. 
This research yielded two principal findings. First, the presence of a social 
navigation system increased the inequality and unpredictability of songs’ 
popularity. Salganik et al. measured inequality by the number of downloads; 
when a social navigation system was available, users downloaded highly popular 
songs more often than in the control condition and downloaded less popular 
songs less often. This finding is similar to the power law distribution that arises 
from the social navigation system that is the WWW: a social navigation system 
increases the inequality between items.  
Salganik et al. also found that social navigation systems increased the 
unpredictability of songs’ popularity. All sites that employed social navigation 
listed the number of downloads next to a song; however, some sites ordered 
songs based on the number of times they had been downloaded, and other sites 
randomly ordered the songs. Salganik et al. consider song ordering by popularity 
to be a stronger form of social navigation, and they found that increasing the 
presence of social navigation corresponded to increased unpredictability of a 
song’s popularity. 
Salganik et al. argue that these findings demonstrate that (1) social navigation 
systems exert social influence (Bond & Smith, 1996) on users and (2) social 
influence from social navigation systems yields unpredictable and suboptimal 
results. When a social navigation system is available, a song’s quality is only a 
partial indicator of its success. The other indicator of success is the dynamic 
interactions among users’ behavior and the social navigation system that 
aggregates and displays that behavior. 
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3.6 Summary 
The following points summarize the observations of herding in social 
navigation systems: 
• Herding occurs in multiple types of social navigation systems—including 
systems that simply aggregate and present user activity and those that 
employ user ratings to perform complex collaborative filtering—and in 
multiple domains. Herding, then, is likely a general phenomenon of social 
navigation systems and not an artifact that arises from particular systems or 
system features. 
• There is a close connection between individual behavior—which is a key 
facet of the social navigation user experience—and group behavior in 
herding, and numerous analyzes suggest that social influence at the 
individual level leads to herding at the group level. In general, then, it is 
useful to consider both individual and group behavior in social navigation 
systems and how they impact each other. 
• Herding often leads to undesirable behaviors and outcomes. Herding can 
lead users astray and down paths that are not useful. Herding can also can 
skew community data from a social navigation system and make it 
inaccurate, and this can lead users to make misinformed decisions. Finally, 
herding can lead to inequality and unpredictability amongst a set of items 
and can prevent high-quality items from becoming popular. 
• Several social navigation system researchers posit that providing additional 
information to users, such as user groups or expertise among users, can 
mitigate herding. These ideas are largely untested; moreover, there is 
evidence that increasing the unanimity of community data can in fact lead to 
more herding. 
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Based on these observations, these questions about herding arise: 
• What are the mechanisms and conditions that undergird herding in social 
navigation systems? 
• What connections can be made between individual behavior, the social 
navigation user experience, and group behavior in social navigation 
systems? 
• Under what conditions does herding occur in social navigation systems? 
And when does herding in social navigation systems lead to undesirable 
behaviors and outcomes? 
• How can herding be mitigated in social navigation systems and what are the 
potential costs of such mitigation? 
 
38 
CHAPTER 4  
A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR UNDERSTANDING 
THE SOCIAL NAVIGATION USER EXPERIENCE 
 
A large and significant body of research on computer-mediated human 
behavior shows that core tenets of behavioral and social science research hold 
true in computer-mediated environments [e.g. (Cosley, 2006; Reeves & Nass, 
1996)]. This is unsurprising as it is unlikely that interactive computing has 
altered human behavior fundamentals. Given the relatively static nature of 
human behavior, it is likely fruitful to develop a foundation for understanding the 
social navigation user experience from research in other disciplines that has 
investigated behavior related to social navigation. Specifically, this chapter argues 
that social navigation is largely an online manifestation of numerous well-studied 
offline behaviors. 
Nonetheless, interactive computing has and continues to have a significant 
impact on human behavior. Interactive computation affords new and more 
powerful applications of socially-guided behavior. Traditionally, physical or 
temporal constraints limit the transmission of social data, but interactive 
computing can obviate many such constraints. Computation simplifies and 
provides flexibility in all facets of social information usage, from collection to 
aggregation to display. Hence, the potential applications of social navigation in 
interactive computing are expansive, and it is important to appreciate and 
enhance the subtleties of social navigation in different domains. 
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Recall that this thesis defines the social navigation user experience to be how 
users perceive, make sense of, and employ community data from social 
navigation systems. To develop a theoretical foundation for understanding the 
social navigation user experience, it is useful to build upon psychological and 
economic research rather than start from scratch. Psychology and economics 
have produced much research documenting and understanding how individuals 
engage in socially-aided decision making. Decision making is a core perspective 
in my approach to understanding the user experience of social navigation, and 
hence these disciplines provide useful foundational elements upon which to 
develop a theoretical understanding of the social navigation user experience. 
This chapter discusses three areas of research that undergird the social 
navigation user experience: psychological research of social influence, 
psychological research of advice taking and giving, and economic research of 
informational cascades. A synthesis of these bodies of research with the research 
in social navigation systems yields five hypotheses about the social navigation 
user experience. These hypotheses summarize the output from this theory-
building process and afford evaluation of the process. 
4.1 Psychological Research of Social Influence 
Psychologists have studied how social data—what other people are saying and 
doing—can influence an individual’s decisions. In a classic study by Solomon 
Asch, individuals were asked to make straightforward, perceptual judgments 
about the lengths of lines. However, before making their judgment, each 
individual watched other people, who were—unbeknownst to the individual— 
confederates in the experiment, make numerous incorrect judgments. In this 
experiment, subjects answered incorrectly about 30% of the time (Asch, 1951). 
These findings suggest that individuals are strongly influenced by others’ 
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decisions, and that this influence leads individuals to make a choice that agrees 
with the community consensus. Psychologists have labeled these behaviors, 
saying that social influence leads to conformity. 
Subsequent research suggests a more nuanced portrait of social influence. A 
study by Deutsch and Gerard indicates that there are two types of social 
influence: normative and informational (Deutsch & Gerard, 1965). Normative 
influence occurs when individuals conform to the group opinion in order to avoid 
conflict or gain acceptance with others; this is the influence thought to be active 
in Asch’s experiment. Informational influence occurs when individuals conform 
to the group because the individual employs the group opinion as a source of 
information. To demonstrate informational influence, Deutsch and Gerand 
showed that the less accurate an individual’s information was, the more often he 
would conform. This result indicates that people were looking to see what 
decisions others had made, assuming those decisions were accurate, and using 
those decisions to guide their own decision.  
Additional experiments measuring social influence provide insight into factors 
that impacts its strength. Bond and Smith performed a meta-analysis of studies 
using Ashe’s line judgment task and, among other findings, determined that 
social influence decreases if individuals are making decisions in an individual 
area rather than in a room with other group members (Bond & Smith, 1996). 
Baron et al. documented interactions between social influence, incentives to 
answer correctly, and task difficulty in a study of eyewitness accuracy (as in the 
case of court testimony). This research yielded the following findings: (1) in 
general, increased incentives lead to greater social influence; (2) if a task is easy 
and incentives are high, social influence decreases and people conform less; and 
(3) if a task is difficult and incentives are high, social influence increases and 
people conform more. Taken together, these results indicate that, when 
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incentives are high, people are largely subject to informational influence; 
furthermore, difficult tasks can increase the effect of informational influence 
(Baron et al., 1996). 
Consider social navigation in the context of social influence. Social navigation 
necessarily assumes some level of social influence; if users were not subject to 
social influence, there would be no reason for social navigation systems to 
provide community data. In fact, any social navigation system that augments a 
space and enables a user to see—before he acts—what actions or behaviors other 
people have taken is likely to generate social influence. It is, however, an open 
question whether social navigation is the product of normative influence or 
informational influence. Because either type of influence can result in social 
influence and social conformity, it is not clear which type of influence arises from 
social navigation systems. 
Recall that Cosley et al. showed that recommendations from a social 
navigation system exert social influence on users, causing them to re-rate items 
more closely to the recommended rating than they had in the past (Cosley et al., 
2003). However, this research did not attempt to determine the type of social 
influence the users are subject to. The type of social influence that a social 
navigation system exerts is quite important, as it impacts how a system might be 
improved to support usage of its community data. 
Taken together, the characteristics of social influence and social navigation 
activities suggest that community data from a social navigation system exerts 
informational influence on users. When users employ community data, they are 
actively engaged in information-seeking, and this engagement suggests that there 
is motivation—and thus personal incentives—to make a correct decision. 
Moreover, individuals employ community data anonymously and individually 
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rather than in a group setting. Based on these factors and the research discussed 
previously, I posit the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Community data from a social navigation system 
exerts informational influence on users. 
4.2 Giving, Accepting and Using Advice 
A second body of psychological research that contributes to understanding the 
social navigation user experience is that of giving, accepting, and using advice. 
The general experimental setup for advice-taking experiments involves a decision 
maker and an advisor (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). The first step is for both a 
subject and an advisor to read about a decision and then make an initial guess. 
Next, the advisor’s guess is provided to the subject, and the subject is asked to 
make a final guess based on his initial guess and the advisor’s guess. The accuracy 
of the subject’s final decision is the dependent variable in advice-taking 
experiments. 
Advice-taking experiments have numerous potential independent variables. 
An advisor will sometimes estimate the accuracy of his guess (e.g. 85%), and this 
estimate will be provided to the subject along with the advisor’s guess. Subjects 
may also be asked to refine their guesses across multiple iterations using multiple 
advisors’ guesses. Other variables employed in advice-taking experiments include 
expertise levels, incentives, and task type. This experimental structure is similar 
to social navigation: a user employs community data, a form of advice, to make a 
decision. 
Individuals seek and accept advice for three reasons (Yaniv, 2004b). Firstly, a 
decision maker can often improve judgments and decision-making by accepting 
advice. The other two reasons for accepting advice are driven by social and 
societal motivations: accepting advice can help a decision maker justify her 
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decision, and accepting advice can serve to diffuse responsibility from the 
decision maker. Depending on context, these latter two motivations for accepting 
advice can either increase or decrease the accuracy of a decision. 
There are several significant findings from psychological studies of advice 
taking that are relevant to social navigation (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv, 
2004a). First, individuals improve their accuracy considerably by using advice 
during estimation tasks, such as when famous historical events occurred. 
Experimental data suggests that as few as 3-6 semi-independent opinions can 
improve an individual’s decision. Second, the implicit weighting that individuals 
employed to integrate opinions demonstrated two interesting features. First, 
individuals engage in ego-centric discounting, weighting their opinion more 
substantially than others’ opinions (the average self-other weighting system is 
70%-30%). Second, individuals discount opinions based on their distance from 
their own opinion, and opinions very far from an individual’s opinion are 
discounted completely. These findings provide support for the intuition that 
seeking others’ advice is a useful practice and perhaps could be further improved 
by mitigating ego-centric discounting. 
I discuss the application of advice-taking research to the social navigation user 
experience in greater detail below. Nonetheless, this discussion of advice-taking 
and its relationship to social influence and social influence is sufficient to 
hypothesize that ego-centric discounting—one of the most robust findings in 
advice-taking research (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006)—applies to the social navigation 
user experience as well: 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals perform ego-centric discounting on 
community data from a social navigation system. 
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4.3 Comparing Social Influence and Advice Taking 
It is instructive to compare the bodies of social influence research and advice-
taking research and their application to social navigation systems. There are 
thorough overviews of social influence research (Bond & Smith, 1996) and 
advice-taking research available (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv, 2004b). I use 
the term “social data” denotes the data that an individual can observe about 
others decisions or action; in social influence experiments, social data is the 
collection of decisions that others have made, and social data is advice-taking 
experiments is the advice provided to an individual. 
Social influence research and advice-taking research share many similarities. 
To begin, these bodies both show that individuals often look to others’ decision, 
behaviors, or opinions when making decisions, and this activity impacts their 
decisions. There are also parallels between the two types of social influence and 
the three reasons that individuals accept advice. Informational social influence is 
similar to and likely drives the acceptance of advice to improve a decision’s 
accuracy. Normative influence likely drives the acceptance of advice to justify a 
decision and diffuse responsibility, although there are likely to be elements of 
informational influence as well. 
However, just as I have argued that normative influence is minimal in social 
navigation systems, I argue that users are unlikely to use community data to 
justify a decision or diffuse responsibility for a decision. Using community data to 
these ends requires that users’ decisions be made public and that they be held 
accountable for their decisions. Accountability arises from a social or community 
structure that prescribes accountability among individuals and roles in the 
structure. Today’s social navigation systems rarely exist within a social or 
community structure, and hence users typically answer only to themselves for 
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their decisions. This is another reason to hypothesize that community data from 
social navigation systems exerts informational influence rather than normative 
influence on users or, stated alternatively, that users employ community data to 
improve the accuracy of their decisions. 
There are important differences between social influence research and advice-
taking research as well. In general, social influence research considers simple 
decisions, simple contexts, and simple social data. Decisions in social influence 
research focus on a small number of discrete choices, and many decisions have 
only two choices. Moreover, decisions in social influence research are made 
immediately rather than contemplated and made at later time. Lastly, social 
influence research typically does not ascribe any particular attributes, such as 
expertise or authority, to the people that are generating the social data. 
In contrast, advice-taking research focus on more complex decision making 
tasks. The decisions studied in advice-taking research are often continuous, such 
as approximating a percentage of wealth to put into a particular investment 
opportunity; these are also decisions in which individuals are able to reflect for a 
period of time before making a decision. Finally, advice-taking research has 
explored how people incorporate social data obtained from others with either 
expertise or authority and how these attributes impact the use of the social data. 
Just as decisions can be simple or complex depending on various factors, social 
navigation systems can also be labeled as simple or complex. Social navigation 
systems that collect and display implicit activity data and weight all users’ data 
equally can be considered simple, while social navigation systems that collect and 
display explicit activity data along with user attributes are more complex. For 
example, a simple social navigation system can produce a list of the most read or 
purchased books. A complex social navigation system might allow users to write 
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book reviews and enable others to rate reviewers and can produce a list of filtered 
reviews. 
I purposely utilize the same adjectives—simple and complex—to differentiate 
between social influence research and advice-taking research as I do for 
describing the differences between social navigation systems in order to draw 
parallels amongst the comparisons. Social influence research studies simple 
decisions that are most often supported by simple social navigation systems. In 
contrast, advice-taking research studies more complex decisions, and these 
decisions are more often supported by complex social navigation systems. Hence, 
it is likely that social influence is a useful framework for understanding how users 
employ community data from simple social navigation systems.  
It is less clear which framework is best employed to understand the social 
navigation user experience of a more complex social navigation system; both the 
social influence framework and the advice-taking framework likely can provide 
insight into usage of a more complex social navigation system. Figure 4.1 
summarizes the application of psychological research toward the understanding 
of the social navigation user experience. Because I limit my focus in this thesis to 
simple social navigation systems that employ activity data, I do not derive any 




• both in-the-moment and reflective 
decisions 
• many choices 
• explicitly created data (e.g. ratings) 
• contextual (e.g. accountability) and 
user attributes (e.g. expertise) 
Social Influence Research 
• in-the-moment decisions 
• discrete and few choices 
• observational data / implicitly 
created data 
• no contextual or user attributes 
Simple Social Navigation 
• observational data 
Complex Social Navigation 
• explicit data 
Figure 4.1 Applying psychological frameworks to understand the social navigation user 
experience. Social influence research is useful for understanding simple social navigation, and 
advice-taking research is useful for understanding complex social navigation. 
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4.4 Economic Research of Herding 
Whereas psychological research of social influence and advice-taking focuses 
on individuals and their behavior, economic research of social influence focuses 
on groups and their behavior. Figure 4.2 shows my depiction of how the 
psychological research connects to the economic research. I claim that social 
influence at the individual level frequently leads to herding at the group level. 
Specifically, normative influence often leads to irrational herding, and 
informational influence often leads to informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992). 
A classic informational cascade is a stock market bubble. Oftentimes a stock’s 
price will continue to rise not because there is new information to suggest the 
stock’s price should be higher but because each individual buyer infers that a 
stock’s rising price is a signal that others believe a stock’s price should be higher. 
Based on this logic, a buyer or planner then purchases the stock, increasing its 
price even higher and sending a (false) signal to others that he believes the stock 
should be priced even higher. A buyer or planner, then, observes what other 
people are doing (buying the stock), and decides to follow the crowd despite 
having either no information to justify his decision—or perhaps even information 
to the contrary (Devenow & Welch, 1996; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). When many 
individuals employ this type of logic, a cascade can arise. 
Informational cascades are a general socioeconomic phenomenon and are 
paradoxically named: they arise not from a plethora of information but from a 
lack of information. Informational cascades occur when individuals, acting in 
sequence and having observed the decisions of others before them, minimize or 
ignore their own information and make the same decision that the majority of 
others have made. 
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A close reading of informational cascades literature suggests that this body of 
research is founded on two chains of reasoning: (1) emotion drives normative 
influence, which in turn drives irrational herding and (2) rational thinking drives 
informational influence, which in turn drives informational cascades. Figure 4.2 
illustrates the connection between types of social influence and types of herding. I 
focus on informational influence and informational cascades in this thesis, and as 
such I do not further discuss normative influence and irrational herding. 
Surprisingly, individual behavior in a cascade is rational. An individual has two 
general sources of information: (1) private information—information available to 
him and (2) social data about what others are doing. When the information 
sources disagree, an individual should choose to follow the stronger information. 
Frequently, the stronger information arises from social data (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992), and hence an individual frequently 
follows the social data despite contradictory private information. 
However, from a collective perspective, this rational behavior becomes 
problematic. When an individual chooses to follow the community consensus 
rather than use his private information to make a decision, not only is his private 
Figure 4.2 Connecting social influence at the individual level to herding at the group 
level. Normative influence leads to irrational herding, and informational influence leads 
to informational cascades. 
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information lost but his decision also yields false information to subsequent 
decision makers. Subsequent decision makers, seeing others follow the 
consensus, infer that many people in the crowd have private information that led 
them to that decision, when in actuality, those individuals may be simply 
following the consensus. The inference an individual makes based on observed 
decisions of the crowd, then, can be quite inaccurate. Hence, an informational 
cascade arises because the crowd’s signal is falsely strong and continually 
overwhelms the private information that individuals hold. Of course, if the 
crowd’s decision is incorrect, then every subsequent person’s decision will be 
incorrect.  
Economists have studied the theory of informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992) and the frequent, real-world occurrences 
of informational cascades in numerous domains, including financial markets 
(Devenow & Welch, 1996; Walden & Browne, 2002), nutritional 
recommendations (Taubes, 2007), fashions (Bikhchandani et al., 1992), 
information technology adoption (Walden & Browne, 2002), and website 
popularity (Huberman, 2001). Cascades occur at a surprisingly high rate. 
Theoretically, cascades occur at a rate of at least 12% if individuals’ private 
information is 66% accurate (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). In experiments, 
cascades occurred about 80% of the time that they are theoretically possible 
(Anderson & Holt, 2006). Informational cascades are fragile because an 
individual or a small group with strong private information that contradicts the 
crowd’s decision can often start a contradictory cascade quite easily via the same 
processes. Theory also suggests that the more people participating in a system, 
the more likely a cascade will occur (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). 
Cascades do not necessarily lead to bad decisions. However, because it is not 
possible to predict in advance whether a cascade will lead to good or bad 
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decisions, it is often better to mitigate cascades because a cascade that leads to 
bad decisions can have significant negative consequences due to the speed and 
size with which cascades can propagate bad decisions. 
There are three necessary conditions for cascades to (potentially) occur: 
1. individuals make decision in sequence; 
2. individuals can see what decisions others have made; 
3. a discrete set of choices. 
The first two criteria afford the opportunity for earlier decisions to influence later 
decisions, and the last criterion makes it difficult for an individual to make a 
decision that combines both his private information and the information he 
infers from others’ decisions. 
4.4.1 Experiments of Informational Cascade Behavior 
Laboratory studies augment the theoretical research on informational cascades 
by demonstrating how human imperfections and motivations impact theoretical 
predictions (Anderson & Holt, 2006). Experimental studies of cascade behavior 
show that cascades do form, though not as quickly nor as frequently as theory 
predicts. Informational cascades form in about 80% of instances in which theory 
predicts a cascade would form. Errors in individual judgment slowed and 
sometimes prevented informational cascades from developing. Judgment errors 
occurred when there was little incentive for individuals to make correct decisions, 
near the beginning of a sequence when only a few people have made decisions 
(i.e. the crowd’s signal was weak), when private information differs from the 
cascade choices, and when the inferred signal from the crowd and the signal from 
private information are contradictory and approximately equal strength 
(Anderson & Holt, 2006). A recent set of experiments investigated experimental 
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deviations in more detail. Results from one experiment indicate that, over long 
sequences of decisions and a large group, the equilibrium is a cycle of cascade 
formation, collapse, reformation, and so on; moreover, many cascades are 
eventually self-correcting (Goeree, Palfry, Rogers, & McKelvey, 2006). 
A particularly interesting question is the degree to which individuals recognize 
and avoid cascades. Results from a recent study of information types indicate 
people acted in accordance with explicit advice more than implicit activity data 
even though both the advice and the activity data contained the same information 
(Celen et al., 2006). This research indicates that people are tacitly aware that 
activity data is less useful than explicit information. However, in another study 
where only activity data was available, individuals were often unable to recognize 
cascade behavior in others and thus unable to avoid participating in cascades 
(Grebe, Schmid, & Stiehler, 2008). Hence, the doubts that users have regarding 
activity data have little impact on their behavior when the only information 
available is activity data, and cascades are likely to be a common occurrence 
when only activity data is available. 
The principal method that economists suggest for mitigating informational 
cascades is to promote independence among those making decisions, and 
promoting independence in decisions is accomplished by breaking any of the 
three necessary conditions for creating informational cascades. Thus, cascades 
can be prevented by compelling everyone to make decisions at once (instead of 
engaging in sequential decision making) or by hiding previous decisions from 
current decision makers (rather than enabling observation of previous decisions). 
Less effective but still useful in mitigating informational cascades is to provide 
individuals with a continuous set of choices so that individuals can more easily 
integrate and share information inferred from the crowd with their private 
information. 
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4.4.2 An Informational Cascades Perspective on Social Navigation 
Informational cascades arise because observing others is an imperfect form of 
information gathering. Obtaining information from others’ actions or decisions 
involves two basic steps: 
1. observe others’ behavior and actions to gather data; 
2. make inferences to transform the observed data into useful information. 
Social navigation systems make step 1 easier but do little to help users perform 
step 2. Step 2, however, lies at the heart of informational cascades: individuals 
have difficulty inferring information from observations, especially when inferring 
information based on observations of a crowd of people rather than a single 
person. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that informational cascades occur in 
social navigation systems.  
To be precise, discussion throughout this chapter and in Chapter 3 provides 
ample reason to hypothesize that the herding in social navigation systems can be 
characterized as informational cascades. I have argued that informational 
influence is the main type of social influence that social navigation systems exert 
and that informational influence leads to informational cascades. Thus, I 
anticipate that cascades will occur in social navigation systems due to the 
informational influence that the system exerts. Also, social navigation systems 
meet these three criteria for informational cascades. Social navigation systems 
afford sequential decision-making. By definition, social navigation systems 
enable users to see what decisions others have previously made. Finally, social 
navigation systems nearly always offer a discrete set of choices, such as a set of 
hyperlinks or items to choose from. 
In fact, social navigation systems not only meet the criteria for cascades but 
take them to their logical end. A social navigation system allows for unbounded 
sequential decision making because the system records and aggregates data 
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precisely and instantaneously. A social navigation system readily aggregates and 
displays all community data because that is the purpose of the system. Lastly, 
social navigation systems necessarily provide limited, discrete choices because 
only then can the system aggregate choices meaningfully (i.e. if there are too 
many choices, it may not be possible to aggregate decisions or may not be useful). 
Given the sum of this evidence, I argue for a third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Herding behavior in social navigation systems can be 
characterized as informational cascades. 
4.5 The Size and Unanimity of Community Data 
Each of the three bodies of research discussed in this chapter has also 
demonstrated that the size and unanimity of a community’s decisions can impact 
how a community’s decisions impact individual decisions. See Bond and Smith 
(1996) for a discussion of size and unanimity’s impact on social influence, 
Bonaccio and Dahal (2006) for a similar discussion focused on advice-taking, and 
Holt and Anderson (2006) for a discussion centered on informational cascades. 
In general, size has been shown to have a minimal correlation with the 
strength that a community’s decisions exert on individual decisions, but 
unanimity has been shown to have a much stronger impact, especially in social 
influence experiments. Hence, two additional hypotheses about the social 
navigation user experience posit that the size and unanimity of community data 
correlate with the strength of the influence that the community data exerts on 
individual decisions: 
Hypothesis 4: The size of the group that the community data 
represents directly correlates with the strength of the community 
data’s social influence. 
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Hypothesis 5: The unanimity of the group’s consensus that the 
community data represents directly correlates with the strength of the 
community data’s social influence. 
4.6 Hypotheses about the Social Navigation User Experience 
I have developed a theoretical foundation for the social navigation user 
experience by synthesizing research in social navigation systems, social influence, 
advice-taking, and informational cascades. Three hypotheses summarize this 
foundation: 
Hypothesis 1: Community data from a social navigation system 
exerts informational influence on users. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals perform ego-centric discounting on 
community data from a social navigation system. 
Hypothesis 3: Herding behavior in social navigation systems can be 
characterized as informational cascades. 
Hypothesis 4: The size of the group that the community data 
represents directly correlates with the strength of the community 
data’s social influence. 
Hypothesis 5: The unanimity of the group’s consensus that the 
community data represents directly correlates with the strength of the 





CHAPTER 5  
SOCIAL NAVIGATION FOR END-USER PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
 
Social navigation is a promising approach for supporting end-user privacy and 
security management. Since many users are unmotivated to manage their privacy 
and security (Dourish, Grinter, Delgado de la Flor, & Joseph, 2004; Whitten & 
Tygar, 1999) and do not understand the technical issues associated with privacy 
and security management (Gross & Rosson, 2007; Schneier, 2004), social 
navigation systems can provide a new, simpler approach to informed decision 
making. For example, since prior research has shown that users often prefer to 
delegate privacy and security management to others (Dourish et al., 2004), social 
navigation can provide for such delegation: a user that is unsure about how to 
manage his privacy or security can simply choose to follow the community’s 
majority decision. 
This chapter describes two prototype systems that explore how social 
navigation can be employed to help users manage their privacy and security. The 
Acumen system employs social navigation for privacy management; Acumen 
helps individuals manage their Internet cookies both manually and automatically 
based on the behavior of others. The Bonfire system uses social navigation for 
security management; Bonfire is a personal firewall that uses multiple types of 
social navigation data to help users make firewall management decisions. 
Observations from Acumen and Bonfire suggest that, despite the promise of 
social navigation in security and privacy applications, there are significant 
challenges in applying the technique in these domains. In particular, due to the 
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types of decisions and general lack of expertise among users in these domains, 
individuals may make incorrect inferences from a social navigation system’s 
community data and misuse community data when making decisions. These 
incorrect inferences and misuse of community data can lead to even incorrect 
individuals decisions, inaccurate community data, and herding behavior in which 
a community consensus builds for an incorrect decision. 
These challenges serve as the motivation for this chapter. These challenges are 
the result of informational cascades that can arise in these systems. Recall that 
informational cascades occur when individuals, faced with a decision, ignore 
their own information and choose to go with the majority decision, thereby 
creating a herd or cascade (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 
1992). An analysis of Acumen and Bonfire indicates that mitigating informational 
cascades is necessary if social navigation systems are to be useful for privacy and 
security management. 
This chapter is based on research described in (Goecks & Mynatt, 2005a) and 
(Goecks, Edwards, & Mynatt, 2008). 
5.1 Addressing End-User Privacy and Security Management with 
Social Navigation 
It is important to establish why social navigation might be useful for 
supporting end-user privacy and security management; this understanding 
provides the foundation for analyzing the efficacy of social navigation systems 
applied to privacy and security management. In this thesis, the term “end-users” 
denotes users that have no special or explicit training in managing their privacy 
or security. 
There are similarities in how users think about privacy management and 
security management.  Previous research argues that people perceive privacy 
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management to be a boundary management process, and potential privacy 
boundaries include temporal, interpersonal, and boundaries between a private 
and public sphere (Palen & Dourish, 2003). Similarly, there is evidence that users 
perceive security as a barrier which should “keep things out,” regardless of 
whether those things are privacy threats or security threats, and that controlling 
and configuring this barrier is a key activity in security management (Anton, 
Earp, Potts, & Alspaugh, 2001; Dourish et al., 2004). 
In general, when a user manages a boundary for the purposes of meeting 
privacy or security needs, she is making decisions about where to place the 
boundary, what can cross the boundary, and when to change the boundary to 
meet current context and constraints. While this is a very general description of 
boundary management, there is one commonality among most boundary 
management activities: decision making—both implicit and explicit—is the core 
activity of boundary management. It is unreasonable to attempt to automate all 
privacy and security management decisions due to numerous technical and social 
factors that limit the efficacy and acceptance of such automation (Edwards, 
Poole, & Stoll, 2007). Thus it is important to explore solutions that help users 
make good decisions when managing their privacy and security. 
This research, then, focuses on the decision-making processes that users 
engage in when performing the boundary management activities associated with 
meeting their privacy or security needs. Thus, references to privacy and security 
management refer to the decisions that users must make to create, adjust, and 
update their privacy and security settings. Furthermore, a particular area of focus 
is the challenges that users face when making these decisions and how social 
navigation can address these challenges.  
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There are two common issues that end-users face when making privacy and 
security management decisions. First, end users often do not understand the 
technical issues associated with privacy and security management and, lacking 
this understanding, users cannot make informed decisions (Schneier, 2004). For 
instance, when managing a personal firewall, users often must understand what a 
process is, what a port is, and what it means to block a process or port from 
accessing the Internet. In addition, abstractions, such as access policies, are 
common in computer security but problematic for end users (Whitten & Tygar, 
1999), and privacy management is frequently confounded by complex settings 
[e.g. (Millett, B., & Felten, 2001)].  
Another barrier for effective end-user privacy and security management is 
motivation. Most users are uninterested in the technical details of computer 
security (Gross & Rosson, 2007) and lack the incentives and time to effectively 
manage their security (Dourish et al., 2004). A main reason for users’ low 
motivation is that security is frequently a complementary task, performed 
alongside or in conjunction with a primary task (Whitten & Tygar, 1999).  
Low motivation to engage in privacy and security management activities leads 
users to engage in particular behaviors. First, users often seek to spend as little 
time as possible on security and thus make security decisions quickly, do not 
experiment with security settings, and do not revisit past security decisions 
(Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007b). Second, many users try to delegate privacy and 
security management to other people (Dourish et al., 2004). In many instances, 
however, users may struggle to find delegates because expertise in privacy and 
security management is rare. 
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5.1.1 Matching Social Navigation to End-user Security and Privacy 
Management 
Social navigation has the potential to address the common problems in end-
user privacy and security. Recall that social navigation systems enable a user to 
see what other people have been doing or saying by automatically capturing, 
aggregating, and displaying the behavior and activities of its community of users 
(Dourish & Chalmers, 1994). For example, a social navigation system might 
provide “paths” based on previous user behavior that lead to the most highly 
rated posts in a discussion forum, the most frequently downloaded food recipes 
from an online cookbook, recommendations for songs that a user might be 
interested in purchasing from a music store, or—in the case of Dourish and 
Chalmers’ original work—navigation of information spaces based on social 
activity rather than spatial markers (Dourish & Chalmers, 1994). 
Recall that one challenge users face when making decisions to manage their 
privacy or security is understanding the technical issues associated with a 
decision. Using social navigation systems to support privacy and security 
management means that users have an additional source of data in the system’s 
community data, and this data may be easier to understand and use than the 
technical data typically associated with privacy and security decisions (Herzog & 
Shahmehri, 2007b). Also, people often are able to learn quickly by observing 
others (Bandura, 1977), and social navigation supports this type of learning as 
well. 
The other principal challenge in privacy and security management is low 
motivation among users and their preference for delegating privacy and security 
management (Dourish et al., 2004); social navigation can address this challenge 
as well. A simple social navigation system that collects and displays a 
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community’s actions and decisions imposes minimal burden on users, and thus 
individuals can participate and use a social navigation system with nominal 
effort. Social navigation systems provides a way for users to delegate their 
decisions to others: a user that is unsure of how to manage his privacy or security 
can simply choose to follow the community’s majority decision. 
Finally, preliminary research has analyzed how social navigation might be 
applied to end-user privacy and security management. An analysis of user help 
techniques for end-user security applications suggests that social navigation is 
amongst the most natural and straightforward forms of help and learning, though 
it does requires interpretation of community data (Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007b). 
DiGioia and Dourish recently discussed how social navigation might help users 
understand patterns of conventional use and the activities of others (DiGioia & 
Dourish, 2005). This chapter describes research that builds on this work, taking 
significant steps to understand how social navigation helps users make decisions 
to manage their privacy or security and what challenges arise from using social 
navigation in these domains. 
5.2 Supporting End-User Privacy Management with Social Navigation  
This section describes the application of social navigation to help users manage 
a common Internet privacy problem. 
5.2.1 The Problem: Managing Web-browser Cookies 
A common privacy concern that Internet users have is the collection of 
personal data by third parties; users want the ability to control when, how, and 
what information they share with third parties (Jensen & Potts, 2005; Paine, 
Reips, Stieger, Joinson, & Buchanan, 2007). Internet cookies are particularly 
troublesome in this respect because websites can use cookies to collect and store 
information about users; sites often use cookies to monitor users’ browsing 
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activities. In fact, at least thirty-five percent of websites use cookies to collect 
such information (Federal Trade Commission, 2000).  
Much work has been done to help users manage their cookies. Many online 
privacy policies describe how a website uses cookies and what data they collect 
using them, but online privacy policies are often difficult to locate and 
understand (Jensen & Potts, 2004). The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 
specification enables websites to encode a privacy policy in a machine-readable 
format; software agents can then interpret and utilize P3P policies (Cranor, 
2002). P3P, however, has not simplified web browser or cookie privacy settings. 
Both of today’s major browsers, Internet Explorer and Firefox, provide users 
with the ability to manage cookies in various ways. However, studies of past 
versions of these browsers show that there are problems and inadequacies with 
both browsers’ cookie management tools, such as making them hard to find and 
modify, providing little on-going awareness of cookies, and using terminology 
that users do not understand (Friedman, Howe, & Felten, 2002; Millett et al., 
2001). Recent studies show that while awareness of cookies is growing, many 
users are not knowledgeable enough to manage cookies effectively 
(InsightExpress, 2007; Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2005). 
 5.2.2 Acumen 
The Acumen system (Goecks & Mynatt, 2005b) (Figure 5.1) helps users 
manage their web-browser cookies.  
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Figure 5.1 Screenshots of the Acumen system. From top left clockwise: (a) the 
Acumen Internet Explorer toolbar on The New York Times website; (b) the Acumen 
Firefox Sidebar on the MSNBC website; and (c) detailed community data about a 





Acumen was developed using an iterative design process; six full iterations were 
completed. During each iteration, numerous interface prototypes were 
developed, and the most promising prototypes were presented to a mix of HCI 
practitioners, privacy experts, and everyday users to obtain feedback from them. 
Feedback was obtained from a mix of individuals in order to gather data from 
individuals with different levels of expertise and diverse perspectives. 
Practitioners and experts were quite important to the process because they 
provided insights that users did not, especially the potential problems that users 
might have in using Acumen’s community data. Feedback obtained during each 
iteration was employed to refine and select techniques from both social 
navigation systems research and digital privacy management research for 
subsequent iterations. 
Acumen integrates with a browser’s standard cookie management 
functionality; users manage cookies at the website level, allowing or blocking 
cookies from websites. Acumen allows all cookies by default. As a user browses 
the web, Acumen provides information about the websites that are using cookies 
on the pages that he visits and community data for these websites. When a user 
visits a webpage, Acumen displays the websites using cookies on the page and 
next to each website, an icon that summarizes the community data for the 
website. 
Acumen’s community data consists of the number of users who have “visited” a 
website (i.e. requested a file from the site), the number of such users who allow 
the site’s cookies, and the number of users who block the site’s cookies. Collecting 
and displaying this simple form of community data has proven successful for 
promoting awareness and supporting decision making in the past (Hill et al., 
1992; Svensson et al., 2001; Wexelblat & Maes, 1999). Acumen encodes its 
community data in a circle icon using colors established by the Privacy Bird 
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application (Cranor, 2002); using a colored icon as the primary indicator has 
been shown to be effective in providing information to users when they are 
making a privacy decision (Cranor, 2006). 
Users can leverage Acumen’s community data in multiple ways. Like the 
Privacy Bird, Acumen enables a user to maintain awareness of ongoing privacy 
actions and changes via a persistent, peripheral interface near the top of the web 
browser. Acumen’s interface enables a user to maintain awareness of (a) the 
websites using cookies on the web pages that she is visiting and (b) whether other 
community members generally allow or block cookies from these sites. When 
making the decision to allow or block a website’s cookies, users can view the site’s 
community data in detail and use this information to inform their decision. 
Users can also employ simple rules that leverage community data to 
automatically block cookies. Users can create rules of the form ‘If X% of users 
have blocked cookies from a website, then automatically block the site’s cookies.’ 
Users choose a rule’s threshold percentage when they create it. Using community 
data to automate actions is novel; the purpose of this feature is to help users 
more easily delegate cookie management to the community. 
A concern that became prominent when designing Acumen is herding behavior 
(Banerjee, 1992). In herd behavior, individuals unsure of a decision often choose 
to follow the majority—the herd—causing the herd to grow, which then leads even 
more individuals to follow the herd. Herding behavior can continue via this cycle 
for a long time, and if users build a consensus for an incorrect decision, many 
users can be mislead and thus choose the incorrect decision. 
Herd behavior is especially likely in Acumen for two reasons. First, most users 
have little knowledge of cookie management and thus are likely to follow the 
majority decision. Secondly, herd behavior is likely because users cannot delay 
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making management decisions about cookies, even if there is very little 
community data to help them. When a user visits a webpage using cookies, he 
must choose whether to allow or block those cookies immediately, even if there is 
limited community data. Decisions made with less community data are often 
more prone to herding behavior because there is less information contained in 
the data (Banerjee, 1992). 
In an effort to mitigate bad herding behavior—herding behavior that leads to 
poor, incorrect, or uninformed decisions—Acumen provides community data 
from a select subset of ‘experts.’ Acumen leverages experts’ knowledge by 
anonymously identifying and providing community data from them. Providing 
expert community data can help mitigate bad herding behavior and also promote 
good herding behavior by enabling uninformed users followed experts. 
To identify experts, Acumen computes an ‘expert rating’ for each individual, 
based on a user’s breadth and depth of cookie management activity. Acumen 
labels users with the top 20% of ratings as experts and encodes the experts’ 
community data as a smaller circular icon embedded in the large community data 
icon. Embedding the experts’ data this way makes it easy for users to see the 
expert data and contrast it with the overall community data. 
5.2.3 Lessons Learned from Acumen 
A limited, controlled deployment of Acumen was performed. Nine users used 
Acumen for six weeks, and the deployment’s goal was to obtain data about and 
develop a better understanding of the challenges encountered during Acumen’s 
design. At the end of the six weeks, Acumen’s database contained data for over 
2650 websites; users had blocked cookies from 85 websites using Acumen. There 
are two lessons to be learned from Acumen’s design and deployment. 
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Firstly, Acumen was successful at helping users make good decisions for 
cookies with clear criteria. Acumen’s users generally allowed ‘good’ cookies, 
which provided a high benefit with a low cost, and blocked ‘bad’ cookies, which 
provided little benefits but had a high cost. However, for cookies with a more 
complex or ambiguous benefit-cost ratio, Acumen proved less useful as users 
disagreed about whether to allow or block such cookies. 
Another way to state this finding is that Acumen’s community data proved 
useful for making objective decisions—decisions where personal preferences or 
biases were relatively unimportant in the decision-making process—and less 
useful for subjective decisions. 
Secondly, in interviews, six of nine users indicated that they engaged in 
herding behavior and blocked a site’s cookies because others had. It was difficult 
to determine whether experts’ community data was useful in mitigating herd 
behavior due to the small number of users in the deployment. That said, three of 
nine users indicated that they were skeptical that experts were more 
knowledgeable than other users and chose to use community data from all users 
rather than experts’ data. 
5.3 Supporting End-user Security Management with Social Navigation 
This section describes how social navigation can be applied to address a classic 
end-user security management problem: personal firewall management. 
5.3.1 Personal Firewall Management 
A personal firewall is software that enables an individual to control the data 
flow between his computer and the Internet; typically, a user controls this data 
flow by granting or denying software applications on his computer access to the 
Internet. Personal firewalls are increasingly important because pervasive, 
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persistent, and high-bandwidth connections to the Internet are becoming 
common both in the home and in public (via wireless hotspots) (Horrigan, 2007; 
Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2006). More than half of all broadband 
users have installed a personal firewall (Pew Internet & American Life Project, 
2004). 
Persistent, high-bandwidth connections to the Internet pose numerous 
security and privacy risks to users. These connections make it easy for users to 
download, run, and accidentally share malicious software—such as software that 
attempts to obtain passwords or financial records for use in identity theft.  
Data flow between a user’s computer and the Internet also has privacy 
implications. For instance, there are applications that report information about 
an individual’s activities back to web servers on the Internet, such as his web 
browsing activities13 and whether he read an email message14. Finally, general 
annoyances also arise from data flow issues; popup windows from spyware often 
occur because the spyware is connecting to another computer on the Internet. 
End users can significantly alleviate these problems by using a personal 
firewall effectively; effective use of firewalls means making good decisions about 
which programs are allowed connect to, send, and receive data from the Internet.  
Unfortunately, using a personal firewall effectively is difficult because personal 
firewalls suffer from two significant end-user security management problems 
discussed earlier: (1) firewall management is a complementary activity to other 
primary activities, such as sending and receiving email, browsing the Internet, 
and updating software; and (2) firewall management often requires users to 






understand technical information—such as IP addresses, ports, and processes—in 
order to complete primary tasks (Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007a). 
5.3.2 Bonfire 
Bonfire (Figure 5.2) is a personal firewall infused with a social navigation 
system. The goals for Bonfire were to explore (a) the application of social 
navigation to a new problem domain and (b) the mitigation of herding behavior 
using lessons learned from Acumen. 
Bonfire was also developed using iterative design. Prototypes of Bonfire’s 
interfaces were repeatedly developed and presented to HCI practitioners, security 
experts, and everyday users to get feedback; feedback was applied to refine and 
select techniques from the social navigation and security management bodies of 
research. A total of seven iterations were completed to create Bonfire. 
Bonfire provides functionality comparable to other popular personal firewalls, 
notifying a user via a popup alert window (Figure 5.2, top) when a firewall 
management decision must be made. Bonfire notifies a user when a program on 
his computer attempts to access the Internet or tries to receive connections from 
Internet. Bonfire also provides a summary window (Figure 5.2, bottom) where 
users can view current rules, create new rules, and delete unwanted rules. Rules 
dictate the programs that can access the Internet and those that cannot. 
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Figure 5.2: Screenshots of the Bonfire system. Top: alert window that enables users 
to employ community data to make firewall management decisions; bottom: Bonfire’s 
summary interface for viewing firewall decisions in relation to the community. 
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Bonfire’s community data is organized around programs (e.g. itunes.exe, 
mysearchbar.exe); for a program, Bonfire records the number of users who have 
allowed a program Internet access and the number of users who have blocked the 
program’s access. Bonfire uses this community data in multiple ways throughout 
its interfaces. Bonfire also enables users to employ tagging (Dourish et al., 2000; 
Shilad et al., 2006) as a supplementary community data source in Bonfire. 
Tagging is the practice of applying multiple, short words or phrases to describe 
an item; each word or phrase is an independent tag that describes the item. 
Bonfire presents community data in a section of its alert window. At the top of 
this section is the most popular action that the community has taken when faced 
with this decision. This information is presented as text and via a colored circle 
that corresponds to the background color of the decision buttons at the bottom of 
the window. The purpose of this correspondence is to reinforce the connection 
between Bonfire’s community data and the user’s decision. Using a colored icon 
as the primary indicator, as Bonfire does for its community data, has been shown 
to be effective in providing information to users when they are making a security 
decision (Cranor, 2006). 
Next, more details of Bonfire’s community data are provided in the form of 
‘popular actions.’ This is a list of frequent decisions that the community has 
made, and this information includes, in parentheses, the number of users that 
have made each decision. For some firewall decisions, there are more than two 
choices, hence use of label ‘popular actions,’ which can accommodate multiple 
options. 
Finally, Bonfire shows the most popular tags that users have applied to the 
program. Tagging is a response to the herding behavior that occurred in Acumen 
and is likely to occur in Bonfire for the same reasons. Many users lack sufficient 
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technical knowledge to use firewalls (Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007a) and hence 
were likely follow the majority decision. In addition, there were likely to be 
instances in which users were faced with a firewall management decision and for 
which there was little community data, and herding towards incorrect decisions 
is more likely with relatively little data (Banerjee, 1992). 
Promoting good herding behavior—herding behavior that led to correct 
decisions—in Acumen was quite challenging. Hence, Bonfire was designed to 
mitigate all herding, regardless of whether the herding is good or bad. Feedback 
on early iterations of Bonfire suggested that herding might be mitigated by 
providing additional information to supplement Bonfire’s existing community 
data, such as why others blocked a program’s Internet access or the context in 
which decisions were made. 
For these reasons, tagging was used as an additional source of community 
data. Tagging occupies a “sweet spot” among community data types for a social 
navigation system. Tagging imposes a low burden on users, yet tags are relatively 
easy to understand and use. Tags are often used to facilitate searching and 
navigating, but tags are expected to play a different role in Bonfire. It is 
anticipated that Bonfire’s users will apply tags to a program to describe it or 
indicate why they blocked it. Bonfire’s community data types are intended to 
complement each other. Bonfire’s decision data summarizes the community’s 
actions, and the tagging data provides information about why those actions were 
taken. 
In Bonfire’s alert window, tags that users have applied to a program are below 
the popular actions. As with popular actions, the number in parentheses next to a 
tag is the number of people who have applied the tag. Lastly, the alert window 
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provides a section for a user to input her own tags for the program and make a 
decision for this firewall management question. 
Bonfire’s summary window provides an overview of the application rules that a 
user has created and color-codes the rules to indicate whether the user’s 
decisions agrees (green) or disagrees (red) with Bonfire’s community data. This 
interface makes it easy for users to quickly identify which of their decisions differ 
from the community norm and revisit those decisions as needed. 
5.3.3 Lessons Learned from Bonfire 
Unlike web-browser cookie management, personal firewall management is 
comprised mostly of objective decisions. That is, when users manage their 
firewalls, they are likely to manage them in similar ways; most users employ their 
firewall to block spyware, adware, and other malware, and users generally agree 
on what constitutes malware. While there are individual differences in firewall 
management (e.g. some users will open particular ports to play online 
multiplayer games), the majority of decisions that users encounter are objective. 
This is in contrast to the privacy domain targeted by Acumen, in which there are 
a variety of decision types—subjective decisions, rooted in users’ own orientation 
toward privacy and their daily routines of site visitation, and objective decisions 
guided by the identification of certain sites as misusing cookies or posing a true 
risk to users’ privacy. 
Bonfire’s design demonstrates a promising approach to mitigating herding 
behavior by combining activity-based community data—data about what other 
people are doing—and tagging. This approach provides insight into why herding 
behavior may occur: users may have difficulty interpreting and using solely 
activity-based community data to make privacy and security management 
decisions. Tagging provides a more explicit form of community data that 
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complements the decision-based community data by providing information 
about why users made decisions. 
5.4 Reflections: Understanding Herding in Privacy and Security 
Managements 
Reflections prompted by Acumen and Bonfire suggest that the user experience 
of social navigation in end-user security and privacy management is qualitatively 
different than social navigation in other domains. These differences lead to 
herding behaviors that are especially damaging in the security and privacy 
contexts. 
This section discusses the unique challenges that are inherent in the security 
and privacy domains themselves. These challenges are rooted in the distinction 
between subjective and objective domains and in the connection between the 
herding behavior seen in these domains and the theory of information cascades, 
which can serve as a lens through which to better understand social navigation 
and shed light on opportunities to mitigate herding. 
Concisely, this argument states that when a user encounters an objective 
decision—as is the predominant decision-type in privacy and security 
management—he attempts to infer information from a social navigation system’s 
community data and uses the inferred information to make a decision. If not 
accounted for in a social navigation system’s design, use of a system’s community 
data as an inferential information source can lead to herding behavior and render 
the community data uninformative or even incorrect. Uninformative or incorrect 
community data then leads to numerous and potentially a great number of 
incorrect decisions. 
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5.4.1 Subjective vs. Objective Decisions 
Traditionally, social navigation systems have been applied to domains such as 
music, movies, recipes, and books. In these domains, the system’s goal is to help 
a user make decisions that lead to items that appeal to her; in other words, the 
perspective that matters in these domains is that of individual users. These 
domains are described as taste-based or subjective domains because the 
evaluation criterion is subjective. 
In contrast, objective15 domains are domains where users share evaluation 
criteria and thereby agree on a desirable answer or goal state. Often, however, the 
desirable answer or state is not known in advance. I am not aware of any social 
navigation systems that have been applied to largely objective domains, with the 
exception of the Acumen and Bonfire systems described here. 
For instance, many firewall questions fall into an objective domain. Users 
agree that they do not want malware to connect to the Internet because the 
malware can do damage to their computers. All users, then, will choose to block a 
software program from accessing the Internet if it is known to be malware. In 
summary, users agree on an evaluation criterion—is the software malware?—and 
the desirable decision, blocking malware from accessing the Internet. The 
challenge for a social navigation system applied to firewall management, then, is 
helping users decide whether to block a new program that may be malware. 
Very few domains are completely subjective or objective, but most domains 
have more objective decisions or more subjective decisions. For example, one 
                                                   
 
 
15 For this discussion, ‘intersubjective’ is perhaps a more precise term than ‘objective’ because 
‘intersubjective’ denotes the sharing of subjective states amongst two or more individuals whereas ‘objective’ 
denotes the sharing of states amongst all individuals. However, I use the term ‘objective ‘to draw a clear 
distinction between subjective and objective experiences, decisions, and domains. 
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might posit that domains with a strongly objective flavor might include finances 
(in which maximizing wealth is an objectively “better” decision), healthcare, and 
the privacy and security domains described in this paper. 
An important difference between subjective and objective domains concerns 
how well users are able to make sense of the community data that a social 
navigation system provides.  
In subjective domains, an individual can often readily understand the basis of 
community data and thus make inferences from the data. Community data in a 
subjective domain arises from user preferences. An individual viewing 
community data can be confident that (a) users know their personal preferences 
and (b) users are making decisions that reflect those preferences, such as buying 
a book or choosing a recipe that appeals to their interests. An individual viewing 
community data, then, can infer that users are making decisions with ample 
knowledge and acting according to that knowledge. These inferences are intuitive 
and allow an individual to use community data as an authentic information 
source when making decisions in subjective domains. 
However, this logic frequently does not hold in privacy and security 
management. Managing one’s privacy and security can be complex, and users 
often have limited expertise in these domains. Unlike subjective domains, where 
it can be assumed that users know their personal preferences and act on them, it 
is problematic to assume that others have expertise in objective domains and that 
they are acting on their expertise because this assumption may be incorrect.  
When using community data to make privacy and security management 
decisions, then, this lack of knowledge about others’ expertise makes it difficult 
for an individual to accurately infer information from community data and use 
the data as an authentic information source. This is a key difficultly in using 
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social navigation to support decision-making in privacy and security 
management. 
5.4.1 Informational Cascades in Acumen and Bonfire 
Lessons learned from Acumen and Bonfire indicate that many users welcome 
community data from a social navigation system to help them make privacy and 
security management decisions because they are often unsure of their own 
decisions. When users are unsure of their decision, they are very apt to go along 
with the community consensus, which is made visible through a social navigation 
system’s community data.  
Of particular note is that users often go along with the community consensus 
even when they have information that suggests a decision different than the 
consensus. If enough users engage in decision-making this way, the result is 
herding within a social navigation system, and this herding is sustained and even 
amplified by the system’s presentation of community data. Recall, from Chapter 
4, that this type of herding is an informational cascade. 
In informational cascades, users who are unsure of their own expertise look to 
community data for guidance. Naturally, uncertain users often choose to follow 
the community consensus, and their decision is added to the system’s community 
data. However, subsequent users viewing the community data assume the data 
derives from users with expertise rather than users who are uncertain. If enough 
users misinterpret community data this way, an informational cascades forms. 
Informational cascades lead to a false majority within a social navigation system, 
and the system’s community data does not accurately reflect the community’s 
knowledge. Cascades, of course, can persist for some time and can lead users to 
many suboptimal decisions. 
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5.5 Summary 
By aggregating and presenting the choices made by others, social navigation 
systems can provide users with easily understandable guidance on security and 
privacy decisions, rather than requiring that they understand low-level technical 
details in order to make informed decisions. Lessons learned from Acumen and 
Bonfire suggest that, despite the promise of social navigation, there are 
significant challenges in applying these techniques to the domains of end-user 
privacy and security management. Due to features of these domains, individuals 
may misuse community data when making decisions, leading to incorrect 
individual decisions, inaccurate community data, and informational cascades.  
By understanding this phenomenon in these terms, it is possible to begin 
formulating methods to improve the design and use of social navigation in both 
end-user privacy and security management and other domains. Chapter 8 
discusses how an informational cascades perspective can inform novel features of 
social navigation systems. 
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CHAPTER 6  
AN EXPERIMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE SOCIAL 
NAVIGATION USER EXPERIENCE: DESCRIPTION 
 
Chapter 4 developed five hypotheses about the social navigation user 
experience. This chapter describes the nonprofit choice experiment, an 
experiment to evaluate these hypotheses and explore the social navigation user 
experience more broadly. The experiment’s focus is a simple social navigation 
system for the nonprofit fundraising domain; the purpose of the system is to help 
users decide whether to make a donation to a nonprofit organization. The 
experiment’s structure is based on informational influence experiments (Baron et 
al., 1996; Deutsch & Gerard, 1965) and informational cascades experiments 
(Anderson & Holt, 1997, 2006). 
This experiment is, to the best of my knowledge, the first experiment to 
evaluate whether community data from a social navigation system exerts 
informational influence, whether cascade behavior occurs in social navigation 
systems, and how users employ a combination of objective knowledge and 
community data to make decisions. This organization of this chapter is as follows. 
I first describe the motivation for this experiment and the overall structure of the 
experiment; next, I discuss the decision scenarios, which comprise the heart of 
the experiment, and finally participant recruiting. 




Figure 6.1 The technology-assisted donation lifecycle. 
Previous research (Goecks, Voida, Voida, & Mynatt, 2008) indicates that three 
phases comprise the “online fundraising cycle”: association, donation, and 
feedback (Figure 6.1).  Associations between donors and nonprofit organizations 
lead donors to make donations to organizations, and successful feedback about 
past donations can lead to stronger association and additional donations, thereby 
reinforcing and perpetuating the cycle. The phases in this cycle correspond with 
traditional nonprofit fundraising models [e.g. (Klein, 2006)]. This model also 
connects six important roles of technology within the domain to the phase(s) in 
which they are prominent. The six roles that computational technology plays in 
the nonprofit giving domain: (1) communicating information about nonprofits; 
(2) helping potential donors discover nonprofits; (3) enabling donations; (4) 
enabling directed giving; (5) enabling individual and community advocacy; and 
(6) helping nonprofit organizations learn about technology use. 
Particularly important to the association phase is the first role of technology, 
communicating information. Two of the most important factors that donors cite 
as reasons for donations are having trust in the nonprofit and having a 
relationship with that nonprofit (Cone Inc., 2006). Information sharing and 
81 
communication are often critical for facilitating trust and fostering a relationship 
between donors and a nonprofit organization. One of the most basic roles of 
technology in nonprofit fundraising, then, is enabling the publication and 
communication of nonprofit organization’s activities, goals and impact to 
potential donors. A nonprofit’s online presence includes its website, its online 
advocates, the blogs that it sponsors, its presence in virtual environments like 
Second Life, and its information on third-party sites. 
Third party organizations are increasingly aggregating and analyzing public 
information to provide donors with insight into particular facets of nonprofit 
organizations. Two prominent third parties, Guidestar16 and Charity Navigator17, 
aggregate financial data from IRS 990 forms; all registered U.S. nonprofits must 
file an IRS 990 tax form in order to receive nonprofit tax status, and these forms 
are publicly available. GuideStar indexes 990 data so that it can be searched and 
compared; Guidestar provides numerous types of information, including past and 
present goals, the number of employees and volunteers, financial data (e.g., 
endowment, revenue sources and expenses), locations served, and board 
members. 
Charity Navigator (Figure 6.2) is a “watchdog” organization that uses 990 data 
to rate nonprofits on their financial efficiency using a 5-star system. Financial 
efficiency ratings provide information about how efficiently a nonprofit 
organization employs its donations; a high efficiency rating indicates that a 
nonprofit directs most of its donation towards programs and services rather than 
administration, fundraising, or other expenses. There are other watchdog 






organizations as well, and the majority measure some form of nonprofits’ 
financial efficiency. Donors generally perceive a nonprofit with a high efficiency 
rating to be effective and hence worthy of a donation because most of their 
donation goes directly toward furthering the charity’s primary mission. Other 
prominent United States nonprofit watchdog organizations include The 
American Institute of Philanthropy18 and the Better Business Bureau19. While 
there are drawbacks to evaluating a charity via financial efficiency ratings 
(National Council of Nonprofits, 2005), efficiency ratings are a simple and 
popular information source for donors. 






The watchdog organizations are an example of a general and powerful change 
that technology has brought to the nonprofit fundraising domain. Online 
intermediaries are providing novel types of information about nonprofits to 
potential donors, and donors are using this information to make more informed 
decisions regarding which organizations to direct their donations towards. 
Social navigation systems, then, are a natural class of intermediary for the 
nonprofit fundraising domain as they provide an additional source of information 
Figure 6.2 Charity Navigator webpage for a nonprofit organization. 
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in the form of other people’s action and opinions. Previous research shows 
others’ actions influence both the participation (donation) rate and participation 
amount. Studies show that participation rate increase when a potential donor can 
see others donating (Bryan & Test, 1967), a list of people who have donated 
(Reingen, 1978), and statistics that demonstrate high response rates to 
solicitations  (Frey & Meier, 2004). Donation amounts are also influenced by 
others’ previous decisions. When individuals are informed of what others have 
donated, they adjust their donation amount toward others’ donation amount, 
though the adjust downward more readily than upward (Croson & Shang, 2008). 
Two websites, Great Nonprofits20 and Change.org21, highlight the potential of 
social navigation in the nonprofit fundraising domain. Great Nonprofits enables 
many different types of stakeholders—including donors, volunteers, employees, 
corporate partners, and beneficiaries—to discuss, rate, and review nonprofits. 
Because different stakeholders can comment on a nonprofit organization, the 
organization’s community data—discussions, ratings, and reviews—can provide a 
more complete picture of a organization than can other sites where only a single 
type of stakeholders (e.g. donor) provides feedback. Each individual that provides 
feedback about an organization states their role when interacting with the 
organization, a rating on a 5-star scale, a short comment on their experience. In 
addition, individuals are guided by incomplete sentences to provide particular 
types of especially useful feedback. Individuals can choose to complete sentences 
such as “I’ve seen the results of this organization in…”, “My experience would 
have been better if…”, and “The kinds of staff and volunteers that I met were….” 






Change.org is a website that enables users to organize, communicate, and take 
action based on shared goals called “Changes.” Example Changes include ‘Stop 
Global Warming’ and ‘Improve Public Schools.’ Any user can create a Change and 
join a Change’s group. Associated with each Change group are numerous types of 
user-generated content such as the names of preferred politicians, links to related 
resources, and group impact measures such as the number of group members, 
actions taken on behalf of the Change, and total donations contributed by the 
group. Change.org also enables group members to cultivate a list of nonprofit 
organizations for the Change. Group members can add to the list, comment on 
organizations in the list, vote (positive or negative) on organizations, view the 
amount of money donated to organizations by group members, and donate to an 
organization. 
In summary, then, technology is increasing the number of information sources 
that donors can use to make informed decisions about online nonprofit decisions. 
Two of the most prominent information sources are watchdog financial efficiency 
ratings and community data from a social navigation system. However, the 
impact of these information sources on donors’ decisions—together or 
separately—has not been studied. This experiment explores the impact of these 
information sources on decision making and, at the same time, affords evaluation 
of my hypotheses about the social navigation user experience. 
6.2 Method: Procedure 
Three sections comprise the nonprofit choice experiment: a demographics 
survey, a scenarios section, and a nonprofit giving survey. An initial survey 
collects basic demographic data about participants. The second section asks 
participants to place themselves in the role of potential donors and make a series 
of decisions regarding whether they would make a donation to different nonprofit 
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organizations. For each nonprofit that a participant is asked to make a decision 
for, she is provided with two types of data, financial efficiency ratings and 
community data from a social navigation system. Finally, the nonprofit giving 
section collects data about participants’ nonprofit giving behaviors and priorities. 
Table 6.1 lists the demographic questions that participants answered. In brief, 
these questions include age, gender, race, marital status, zip code (for 
participants in the United States), postal code (for participants in Canada), house 
of worship attendance, educational attainment, and occupation. All of these 
demographic variables have been shown to impact nonprofit donations both 
online (Convio, Sea Changes Strategies, & and Edge Research, 2008; Flannery, 

















• 65 and older 
Gender • Male • Female 
Educational 
Attainment 
• Some High School 
• High School Degree 
• Some College 
• College (Bachelor’s) Degree 
• Some Graduate School 
• Graduate/Professional 
Degree 














• Law Enforcement 
• Clerical/White Collar 





• Unemployed/Looking for 
Work 
• Retired 




• Less than $10,000 
• $10,000 - $24,999 
• $25,000 - $39,999 
• $40,000 - $54,999 
• $55,000 - $69,999 
• $70,000 - $84,999 
• $85,000 - $99,999 
• $100,000 - $149,999  
• $150,000 - $199,999 
• $200,000 - $299,999 
• More than $300,000 
• Prefer not to answer 
Church 
Attendance 
• Once a week or more 
• Once or twice a month 
• Once every couple months 









Zip Code (U.S)  / 
Postal Code (CA) 
• Open  
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Table 6.2 lists the nonprofit giving questions that participants answered. One 
set of questions asked participants to indicate which nonprofit organizations and 
which types of organizations they donated to, how often they donated, how much 
they donated, and their priorities for future donations. Table 6.3 lists the types of 
nonprofit organizations and the examples of each type that were provided to 
participants. Another set of questions were free form and asked participants to 
describe what factors influenced their donation decisions, how they got 
information about these factors, and why they made online donations rather than 
offline donations. Many of these questions are based on other surveys on online 











Table 6.3 Categories for nonprofit organizations and examples used in experiment’s 
nonprofit giving questions. 
Nonprofit Category Examples 
Arts, Culture, Humanities Local museum, symphony 
Environment & Animals Park conservancy, environment preservation 
International Affairs 
 
Third world medical care, education, or economic 
support 
Foundations Gates Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation 
Religion Your local church 
Education Local elementary school or university, after-school 
programs 
Health Cancer research, local hospital 
Human Services A homeless shelter, mentoring 
Public-society Benefit Public zoo, public radio 
 
Table 6.2 Nonprofit giving questions and potential answers. 
Question Answers 
During the last two years, which of the following types of 
charitable/nonprofit organizations have you made donations 
towards? 
• See Table X.3 
Please list all the charities/nonprofit organizations that you 
have made donations towards during the last two years. 
 
During the last two years, about how often have you made 
contributions to charities/nonprofit organizations? 
• Once a week or more 
• Once or twice a month 
• Once every couple 
months 
• Once or twice a year 
• Less than once per year 
During the last two years, what size contribution have you 
made most often to charities / nonprofit organizations? 





• More than $200 
Please rank these areas in terms of your expected future 
charitable donations during the next two years 
• See Table X.3 
Are there situations or circumstances where you choose to 
make charitable contributions online rather than using other 
methods? For which circumstances are you most likely to 
make contributions online? 
• Free text 
What are the most important factors to you when considering 
which charities/nonprofits to make contributions 
towards? Where do you get information on these factors? 
• Free text 
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6.3 Scenarios Section / Donation Scenarios 
The core of the experiment is the scenarios section. In this section, participants 
are asked to place themselves in the role of a potential donor and decide whether 
they would make donations to different nonprofits. For each nonprofit that a 
participant is asked to make a decision for, she is provided with two types of data, 
financial efficiency ratings and community data from a social navigation system. 
Figure 6.3 shows a screenshot of a trial in the experiment. A participant is 
asked whether he would make a donation to an anonymous nonprofit 
organization, and he must select either ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ The participant can see 
financial efficiency ratings from up to three watchdog organizations and 
community data summarizing the decisions made by previous participants. There 
Figure 6.3 Scenario or decision trial in the nonprofit experiment: a participant is asked to 
decide whether he would make a donation to this nonprofit. Two data sources are available: (a) 
watchdog financial efficiency ratings and (b) community data from a social navigation system. 
One watchdog rating is visible (NEL), and two watchdog ratings are hidden (ABE, SUR). The 
community data disagrees with the watchdog rating, and hence the participant must choose to 




are many scenarios in which one or two watchdog ratings are hidden, but 
community data is always visible. 
In the experiment, financial efficiency ratings have two possible values: high 
(green checkmark) or low (red X). Most watchdog organizations rate nonprofits 
on an ordinal scale such as Charity Navigator’s zero to five star scale and The 
American Institute of Philanthropy’s A-F grading scale. The experiment employs 
a simpler scale with only two values for three reasons: (1) participants can more 
easily understand the ratings data and thus the experiment takes less time; (2) 
analyzing participants’ decisions is simpler; and (3) similar experiments in other 
bodies of research, which I discuss below, use a 2-value scale as well. 
The other data source that a participant has when making decisions is 
community data from a social navigation system. The community data is 
ostensibly a summary of the decisions that previous participants have made for a 
particular nonprofit; in fact, the community data is carefully constructed to 
evaluate critical decisions that users may encounter when using both data types 
to decide whether they would make a donation to a nonprofit organization. The 
depiction of the community data is quite simple: small icons that look like people 
denote the number of other participants that have (ostensibly) made a particular 
choice for a nonprofit. This depiction is an absolute representation of the 
community data rather than a relative or saturation representation. 
A critical facet of the experiment is convincing participants that the 
community data derives from other participants who potentially have seen 
different watchdog ratings. It is very important that participants hold this belief 
because community data can exert informational influence only if a participant 
believes that other people may know information that she does not.  
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In order to instill this belief in participants, participants begin the experiment 
by walking through a set of three example scenarios that make this belief explicit. 
Figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 show the three example scenarios. The first example 
introduces participants to watchdog ratings and what they mean. The second 
example shows participants that some watchdog ratings may be temporarily 
unavailable and provides standard reasons for why ratings may be unavailable 
(e.g. connectivity issues, website down, data updates). The third example instills 
the belief that other participants may have seen ratings that the current 
participant cannot see by explicitly stating it. In addition, the text in the 
organizational data table that describes watchdog ratings and community data 
reinforces this belief. After viewing the three examples, participants answer 14 
randomly-selected scenarios. 
 
Figure 6.4 Example 1 in the scenarios section introduces participants to watchdog financial 
efficiency ratings. 
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Figure 6.5 Example 2 in the scenarios section introduces participants to temporarily missing 
financial efficiency ratings and reasons they might be missing. 
Figure 6.6 Example 3 in the scenarios section introduces participants to community data and 
instills the belief that other people may have seen ratings that they cannot see. 
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Finally, Table 6.4 details two final questions that participants encounter after 
they complete the 14 scenarios. These questions ask participants to indicate how 
they made decisions and comment on any aspects of the scenarios that they 
found unreasonable or frustrating. These questions serve two purposes; they 
allow participants to express their feelings about the scenarios’ decisions, and 
they collect useful data about participants’ decision-making processes. 
6.3.1 Experimental Design 
There are 36 potential scenarios that participants may encounter when making 
decisions about nonprofits. These decisions are based on a near-fully crossed 
factorial design with the following independent variables: 
• community data size (5, 15, or 35 people); 
• community data unanimity (60% or 80%); 
• number of visible watchdog ratings (1, 2 or 3 ratings); 
Table 6.4 Feedback questions on decision-making scenarios. 
Question Answer 
In the scenarios, how did 
you make decisions about 
whether you'd donate to a 
nonprofit organization? 
• I mostly used the watchdog ratings. 
• I mostly used the choices made by other participants. 
• I tried to combine the watchdog ratings and choices 
made by other participants. 
• There wasn't enough information to make a 
reasonable decision. 
• I used something else. (Please explain in the comment 
box to the right.) 
Please comment on any 
aspect of the scenarios that 
you feel strongly about. 
Were you asked to make a 
reasonable decision? Was 
the information about each 
nonprofit organization 
clear? Did this information 
help you make a decision 
or not 
• Free Text 
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• values of visible watchdog ratings (2 ratings one direction vs. 1 rating the 
opposite direction, 2 vs. 0, 1 vs. 1, or 1 vs. 0); 
• agreement or disagreement between ratings and community data (yes, no). 
For example, Figure 6.3 shows a scenario where one rating is visible and is 
assigned a negative rating, the community data’s size is 15 and unanimity is 80%, 
and there is disagreement between the ratings and the community data. 
Participants were shown a random selection of scenarios. 
The two independent variables for the community data fully specify the data 
for each choice. The size is the total size of the community, and the unanimity 
determines the size of the majority and minority. Hence, if size is 25 and 
unanimity is 60%, then the majority is 15 and the minority is 10. 
The number and values of visible watchdog ratings are coupled to yield a set 
of watchdog ratings. When three ratings are visible, the ratio is always two 
ratings in one direction and one rating in the opposite direction. This ratio is 
used because a three-zero ratio—all ratings the same—likely obviates any 
community data and makes the decision quite straightforward. When two ratings 
are visible, the ratio is either two-zero or one-one; when one rating is visible, the 
ratio is clearly one-zero. Once the number and values of ratings are chosen, they 
are randomly assigned to each watchdog organization. Thus, each watchdog is 
equally likely to provide a positive or negative rating, and the ratio of watchdog 
ratings is equally likely to be positive or negative. 
The key variable in the construction of scenarios is the agreement between the 
community data and the watchdog ratings. When the community data and the 
ratings agree, they suggest the same decision; when they disagree, they suggest a 
different decision. Figure 6.7 shows examples of both agreement and 
disagreement between the ratings and the community data. When there is 
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agreement between the ratings and the community data, I term these scenarios as 
“expected” scenarios because it is expected that participants will make a decision 
that is suggested by both data sources. In contrast, I term the scenarios when the 
ratings and the community data disagree as “cascade” scenarios because these are 
the instances when informational cascade behavior can arise. 
It is useful to combine the variables number of visible watchdog ratings, 
values of visible ratings, and agreement between ratings and community data 
into a single variable that I call data configuration. Table 6.5 lists the six possible 
values for data configuration. 
Using the data configuration variable yields two advantages. The variable 
simplifies conceptualization of scenarios and participant decision data; scenarios 
are the result of a near fully-factored design with three variables: data 
configuration, community data size, and community data unanimity. Using the 
data configuration variable also provides ready comparisons between scenarios. 
For example, conditions 1 and 2 of data configuration afford comparison of the 
Figure 6.7 Examples of agreement between watchdog financial ratings and community data 
(top) and disagreement (bottom). 
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scenarios in which the community data agrees and disagrees with the watchdog 
ratings. Another example: the cascade conditions—conditions 2, 4, and 5—afford 
analysis of how participants make decisions given different numbers of visible 
ratings and community data that disagrees with the ratings. 
6.3.2 Similarities and Differences between this Experiment and Other 
Experimental Designs 
Recall that the hypotheses that drive this experiment derive from applying 
social influence, advice-taking, and informational cascades research to the use of 
community data from social navigation system. Hence, it is logical that the design 
of this experiment draws significantly from experiments in these bodies of 
research. In particular, this experiment is based largely on informational cascade 
experiments (Anderson & Holt, 2006) because that is the research body that I 
was most knowledgeable about when designing this experiment. However, there 
are also similarities between this experiment and social influence experiments 
(Bond & Smith, 1996) and advice-taking experiments (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). 
It is useful to draw similarities and differences between this experiment and 
experiments in these domains in order to better understand what can and cannot 
Table 6.5 Values for the independent variable data configuration. Variable fully qualifies the 
number of visible ratings, ratings’ values, and whether the ratings agree or disagree with the 
community data. 
  Num. Visible Ratings Ratings’ Values 
Agreement with 
Community Data 
1 3 2 vs. 1 agreement 
2 3 2 vs. 1  disagreement 
3 2 1 vs. 1 ---- 
4 2 2 vs. 0 disagreement 
















6 1 1 vs. 0 agreement 
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be learned from this experiment and to afford comparisons between the findings 
from this experiment and other experiments. 
A primary difference between this experiment and related experiments is its 
focus on computer-mediated or online social influence; other experiments have 
studied social influence in the physical world. However, other experiments have 
studies situations in which individuals employ a proxy that describes or 
summarizes behavior rather than directly observing behavior. Example proxies 
include being told what others have done and observing a stock market ticker, 
which is an indication of how people are valuing financial assets.  
A user interface that displays community data from a social navigation system 
is yet another proxy for summarizing others’ behaviors. To the best of my 
knowledge, there has not been research that compares the efficacy of different 
proxies. Given that many different kinds of proxies have been shown to impact 
human behavior, though, it is reasonable to conjecture that people are adept at 
interpreting and employing different proxies to reason about the human behavior 
that they depict. Thus, there is reason to expect that individuals can readily utilize 
the proxy that is a social navigation system and its interface. 
This experiment draws significantly from informational cascade experiments.  
The standard format for informational cascades experiments is as follows. First, 
the experiment administrator randomly chooses a “world state” to be one of two 
urns; one urn has 2 black balls and 1 white ball, and the other urn has 2 white 
balls and one black ball. Using Bayes’ theorem, each ball is likely to be 66% 
accurate. Participants are then ordered and a series of decisions are prompted 
using a standard protocol. The first participant, in private, selects a ball from the 
chosen urn and, based on his selection, makes a decision about which urn she 
believes was chosen. Her decision is made public—but not the color of the ball 
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she selected—to the other participants. Subsequent participants also select in 
private but can use their selection and other participants’ previous decisions to 
make their decisions. Cascade behavior arises when a participant ignores her 
private information—the color of the ball he selected—and makes a decision that 
agrees with the community consensus. After all participants have made their 
decisions, participants that made the correct decision earn a reward, regardless of 
how they made their decision. 
The key similarity between this experiment and informational cascade 
experiments is that the two information sources in this experiment, the watchdog 
financial efficiency ratings and community data, parallel the information sources 
in informational cascade experiments. The three watchdog ratings are equivalent 
to the three balls used in cascade experiments. Pilot testing suggested that 
participants were confused about seeing a random watchdog rating on a user 
interface because they expect computer interfaces to be able to provide all 
available information; hence, I developed the notion of “missing or unavailable” 
ratings in order to control what ratings participants saw. Nonetheless, the effect 
is the same: a participant sees a limited and imprecise signal but sees all 
community data, and she must make a decision based on this information. 
There are two important differences between this experiment and 
informational cascade experiments (Anderson & Holt, 2006). First, unlike 
cascade experiments, there is no correct answer that can be used to evaluate 
participants’ decisions in this experiment. In cascade experiments, participants 
employ an externally imposed and uniform decision criterion. Similarly, I could 
have asked participants to make a donation to a nonprofit only if they believed 
that it had a majority of positive ratings. I chose not to make the decision 
criterion uniform because it is difficult to convey a uniform decision criterion 
while ensuring that participants engage with the decisions authentically.  
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Because there is not a uniform decision criterion in this experiment, I cannot 
evaluate the efficacy of the social navigation system. However, I can identify 
social influence and cascade behavior among participants and thus can evaluate 
my hypotheses about the social navigation user experience. In addition, because 
participants use their own decision criteria, this experiment can provide insight 
into these criteria. 
The other important difference between this experiment and informational 
cascade experiments is the decision type or structure. In cascade experiments, 
both answers are similar because they carry equal consequences. In this 
experiment, however, a decision to make a donation to a nonprofit organization 
theoretically carries more consequences than a decision to abstain from making a 
donation. In other words, in this experiment, participants can provide a 
theoretically cost-free answer of “no.” The presence of answers that have different 
costs and consequences likely changes how individuals make decisions in this 
experiment as compared to decisions in informational cascade experiments. 
There is a key similarity that this experiment and social influence experiments 
(Bond & Smith, 1996) share: both often manipulate the information available to 
participants and hence the difficulty of the decision. The less information 
participants have, the more difficult it is to make a decision well. It is interesting 
to note that informational cascade experiments do not manipulate the amount of 
information that participants have when making decisions; instead, they hold 
constant the amount of information that participants have, and this amount is 
quite small. 
The principal difference between this experiment and social influence 
experiments (Bond & Smith, 1996) is the type of decision that participants make. 
In social influence experiments, many decisions are simple, perceptual decisions 
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such as line-length or eye-witness matching. The decision in this experiment, to 
make or withhold a charitable donation, is more complex and draws on not only 
perception but also personal preferences. A smaller difference concerns the 
manipulation of incentives for correct decisions: this experiment does not 
manipulate the incentives for participants to make correct decisions, but many 
social influence experiments do and have shown that this can impact 
participants’ decisions. I choose to hold the incentives constant in my experiment 
in order to mirror an authentic donation decision in which choosing to withhold a 
donation is cost-free and choosing to make a donation incurs costs. 
While the notion of advice in advice-taking experiments (Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006) is analogous to providing community data in my experiment, there are 
significant differences between advice-taking experiments and this experiment. 
Advice-taking experiments typically employ a continuous decision scale rather 
than a set of discrete choices; in contrast, participants in my experiment choose 
from a very small number of discrete choices. Hence, in my experiment, it will be 
difficult to assess how much community data impacts particular decisions. 
Advice-taking experiments also often assess how the qualities of advice 
providers—such as expertise—while my experiment does not explore this 
variable. 
6.4 Participant Recruiting 
I conducted this experiment online, following best practices in conducting 
Internet experiments (Reips, 2002). I recruited participants by personal request 
and by advertising on email lists, online forums, search results, and social 
networking websites. 
I designed a unique incentive plan for participation in this experiment in order 
to attract participants that had an interest in fostering and making online 
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nonprofit donations. The incentive plan is based on a donation pool that was to 
be donated to a nonprofit organization at the completion of the experiment. 
When a participant completed the experiment, $2 was added to the donation 
pool and the participant could choose to vote for a nonprofit that he wanted to 
receive the donation pool. At the completion of the study, the nonprofit with the 
most votes received the donation pool as a charitable donation. Thus, the 
incentive for participants to complete the experiment was the generation of a 
small charitable contribution and a vote for a nonprofit that he wanted the 
donation pool to go towards. 
The nonprofits that participants could vote on included Big Brothers Big 
Sisters22, Doctors Without Borders23, DonorsChoose24, and UNICEF25. I chose 
these nonprofits because they demonstrate impact on a national or international 
scale, are generally seen as secular and apolitical, and provide for basic human 
needs. Moreover, these nonprofits are amongst the most highly rated in terms of 
impact and efficiency by Charity Navigator and the American Institute of 
Philanthropy. 
 








CHAPTER 7  
AN EXPERIMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE SOCIAL 
NAVIGATION USER EXPERIENCE: ANALYSES AND 
FINDINGS 
 
This chapter discusses data, analyses, and findings from the nonprofit choice 
experiment that Chapter 6 describes. The focus of this chapter is investigating the 
five hypotheses that motivate this experiment. 
7.1 Hypotheses and Divisions among Scenario Conditions 
The five hypotheses for this experiment are: 
Hypothesis 1: Community data from a social navigation system exerts 
informational influence on participants. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals perform egocentric discounting on community data 
from a social navigation system. 
Hypothesis 3: Herding behavior in social navigation systems can be 
characterized as informational cascade behavior. 
Hypothesis 4: The size of the group that the community data represents directly 
correlates with the strength of the community data’s social influence. 
Hypothesis 5: The unanimity of the group’s consensus that the community data 
represents directly correlates with the strength of the community data’s social 
influence. 
These hypotheses suggest two key distinctions among the scenario conditions. 
Recall that there are 36 potential conditions that a participant may encounter in 
the decision scenarios; the variables that define the conditions are the number 
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and ratio of visible watchdog ratings, the size and unanimity of community data, 
and whether the visible ratings agree with the community data. 
 One very important distinction among conditions is the agreement or 
disagreement between the two data sources, ratings and the community data. I 
term the conditions when there is agreement between the data sources as non-
cascade conditions and term the conditions where there is disagreement between 
the data sources as cascade conditions. This terminology is descriptive as cascade 
behavior—ignoring personal information and making a choice that instead agrees 
with community consensus—is possible only in cascade conditions.  
The division between cascade conditions and non-cascade conditions is 
important because the type of decision differs between each condition set. In 
cascade conditions, participants see disagreement among the data sources; thus, 
their choice reveals that they agree with one data source more than the other. In 
non-cascade conditions, however, participants see agreement among data 
sources, and their choice in these conditions is to agree or disagree with all data. 
Another key distinction among conditions is the decision that the community 
data suggests. For cascade conditions, the suggested decision differed from that 
suggested by the ratings; for non-cascade conditions, the suggested decision is 
suggested by both the ratings and the community data. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
the theoretical cost of making a donation—a Yes decision—is significant, but the 
theoretical cost of withholding a donation—a No decision—is free. Given this 
decision structure, I hypothesize that participants may employ watchdog ratings 
and community data differently depending on whether they suggest making or 
withholding a donation.  
Hence, in the cascade conditions, there is a meaningful distinction based on 
the decision that the community data suggests: (a) conditions in which the 
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watchdog ratings suggest making a donation and the community data suggests 
withholding a donation and (b) conditions in which the watchdog ratings suggest 
withholding a donation and the community data suggests making a donation. In 
non-cascade conditions, the distinction is different because the watchdog ratings 
and community data suggest the same decision. The distinction in non-cascade 
conditions, then, arises between conditions in which the ratings and community 
data suggest making a donation and conditions in which the information suggests 
withholding a donation. 
These two divisions yield seven condition sets, and I analyze decision data 
from each of these condition sets using the following structure: 
1. all conditions; 
2. all cascade conditions; 
o cascade conditions in which ratings suggest Yes and community data 
suggests No; 
o cascade conditions in which ratings suggest No and community data 
suggests Yes; 
3. all non-cascade conditions; 
o non-cascade conditions in which the suggested answer is No; 
o non-cascade conditions in which the suggested answer is Yes. 
These conditions sets afford evaluation of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 posit that the size and unanimity of community data will 
positively correlate with the community data’s impact on participants’ decisions. 
That is, all things equal, community data denoting a larger size group will have 
more impact than community data denoting a smaller group, and community 
data denoting a group with a stronger consensus will have more impact that 
community data denoting a group with less consensus. Surprisingly, no 
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evaluations of social navigation systems have investigated the impact of the 
community data’s size and unanimity. Most studies of social influence (Bond & 
Smith, 1996) and informational cascades (Anderson & Holt, 2006) consider the 
impact of decisions made a small group—usually three to twenty people—on an 
individual’s decision. In contrast, community data can represent the decisions 
made by much larger groups. To evaluate Hypotheses 4 and 5, I analyze the 
impact of the community data’s size and unanimity on the decision data on each 
set and subset of cascade and non-cascade conditions. 
7.2 Analysis of Decision Data from All Conditions: Participant 
Demographic Data & The Dominant Choice in Conditions 
My analysis of decision data from all conditions focuses on participants’ 
demographic data and the dominant decision choice in the conditions. I discuss 
both in turn. 
7.2.1 Participant Demographic Data 
Table 7.1 summarizes the demographic data for the experiment’s participant 
population. To participate in the experiment, participants must have met two 
criteria: (1) be at least 18 years old and (2) have made an online donation to a 
nonprofit organization. These criteria ensure that participants have been and, in 
the future, could be online donors to nonprofit organizations. 215 people 
completed the experiment; about 40% of participants were male and 60% were 
female. The great majority of participants resides in the United States, are 
between the ages of 18 and 40, and have a college degree.  Participants varied 
widely in job type, household income, and church attendance. 
It is useful to determine how this experiment’s population is and is not 
representative of the broader nonprofit giving population; this information can 
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Table 7.1 Summary of participants’ demographic data. 
Feature Summary/ Major Categories 
Number of Participants 215 
Country of Residence 95% United States, 5% Canada 
Gender 38% Male, 62% Female 
Age 75% 18-40 years old 
Education 97% have a college bachelor’s degree or advanced degree 
Race 84% Caucasian 
Occupation 29% White Collar Job, 23% Academia 
Household Income Roughly even distribution from $25,000/year to 
$200,000/year 
Church Attendance 40% never attend, 25% attend at least once/month 
 inform how and to what degree the results of this experiment generalize to 
broader populations. Because this experiment focuses on online nonprofit giving 
and because the great majority of this experiment’s participants reside in the 
United State, I compare this participants’ demographic data with that from other 
surveys of online nonprofit giving by U.S. residents.  
First consider participants’ gender. The Network for Good study of online 
nonprofit giving (Network for Good, 2007) reports that 52% of online donors are 
female. The 2008 DonorCentrics and Internet Giving Benchmark Survey 
(Flannery et al., 2008) reports a similar percentage of female donors but also 
reports that the percentage of online male donors is increasing, albeit slowly. 
Females, then, are overrepresented in this experiment while males are 
underrepresented.  
Next consider participants’ ages. The Network for Good (NfG) survey reports 
that the average age of online donors is 38-40, and the DonorCentrics (DC) 
survey reports that 75% of online donors are distributed equally between the ages 
of 35 and 64. Thus, the participants in the experiment are, on average, slightly 
younger than the average Internet donor. 
108 
Next consider participants’ household income. The household income that 
participants in this experiment reported is the same at that reported in the DC 
survey; the NfG survey does not report household income. Household income for 
participants’ in this experiment, then, is representative of online donors. 
Lastly, consider participants’ education, race, occupation, and church 
attendance. Neither the NfG survey nor the DC survey reported data for these 
demographics features, but another survey of middle and major online donors 
does provide most such data (Convio et al., 2008). Race and household income 
distributions reported by this survey of middle and major donors (MMD) are 
similar to the race and household income distributions of participants in this 
experiment. As compared to occupation distributions in the MMD survey, this 
participants in this experiment overrepresent academic workers and 
underrepresent white-collar workers. The MMD survey provides no data on 
church attendance. 
In summary, the participants in this experiment are somewhat though not 
markedly atypical as compared to the overall online donor population. However, 
there are numerous similarities between participants in this experiment and 
middle and major online donors. Participants in this experiment, then, are more 
representative of middle and major online donors than of the overall online 
donor population. 
7.2.2 The Dominant Choice Suggests that Participants Provided 
Authentic Responses 
Participants answered No in 75% of all decisions despite the community data 
and ratings being equally balanced in both directions throughout all conditions. 
This is a striking finding due to its strength, and there are two implications of this 
finding. First, the division of conditions based on whether the community data 
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suggests a Yes decision or No decision is likely meaningful. Second, a high 
percentage of No decisions indicates that participants likely provided authentic 
answers to the scenario questions. Earlier it was argued that that the decision 
structure for making a donation is such that there is a theoretical cost of 
answering Yes, but the cost of answering No is free. The high percentage No 
decisions supports this argument. 
Moreover, additional data from the experiment indicates that participants 
generally said that they would not make donations to nonprofit organizations in 
the scenarios because they were skeptical of making a donation to an unknown 
nonprofit with limited information and, when they were unsure of a decision, 
they chose the cost-free answer of No. Participants’ expressed frustration because 
they had limited information about a nonprofit (e.g. a nonprofit’s mission and 
size were unavailable). Participants initially expressed this frustration by sending 
unsolicited emails to the contact email address for the experiment. Based on 
these emails, I added the two questions after the scenarios that asked participants 
to answer how they made their decisions and to express any frustrations or 
challenges they had when answering these questions. 77 participants answered 
these questions. 
Figure 7.1 provides a breakdown of users answers to the question “In the 
scenarios, how did you make decisions about whether you'd donate to a 
nonprofit organization?” Nearly 25% of participants said they did not have 
enough information to make decisions, indicating that these participants were 
often frustrated by information they would have preferred to have when making 
these decisions. Here are some quotes from participants about the decisions they 
were asked to make in the scenarios: 
P1: “The information was clear, but I chose "no" for most of the scenarios, because 
in a real world scenario, I would not donate to an organization I had insufficient 
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information about. I keep a folder in my file cabinet related to charitable 
contributions, so if I had insufficient information, I would make a note of it in the 
folder, and revisit it when I was able to get more information. If later I still could 
not find a level of information I was happy with, I would probably stop considering 
that charity as a possible beneficiary of my contributions.” 
P2: “My decisions relating to a charity would not only involve responsible use of 
their money, but also a clear purpose that I agree with and helps others.” 
P3: “I make decisions about service, impact, people served. Making a decision just 
about ratings isn't how I would actually make a gift. The mission and services 
would drive the donation and then I would decide between nonprofits with help 
from other criteria.” 
P4: “I do weigh the efficiency of the organization when deciding to make a 
donation, but there are also many other factors--like to mission of the organization, 
or the values of the person for whom I am making a donation in honor/memory of.” 
P5: “For this experiment, I primarily used the watchdog ratings, since that was the 
only information available to make a choice. I tend to weigh a lot more factors when 
actually making this decision. Whether or not I have money or if I believe strongly 
Figure 7.1 Summary of participants’ answers to the question “In the scenarios, how 
did you make decisions about whether you'd donate to a nonprofit organization?” 
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in the cause seem to matter more when I am deciding to give. But I will not give at 
all if I don't trust the charity or believe it is legitimate.” 
Based on the quantitative data and participants’ quotes, it is clear that donors 
use the watchdog ratings to make donations decisions. However, ratings are a 
less important information source than other factors, such as a nonprofit’s 
purpose and values. In retrospect, the experiment should have framed the 
question more concisely in order to mitigate these more important factors in 
order to encourage participants to focus on the information available rather than 
the information that was not. Nonetheless, because ratings are a factor in 
decision making and because other facets of a nonprofit were hidden, the 
decisions participants made are valid. 
Most importantly, the sum of this data—a significant bias toward No answers 
and frustration about a lack of information—provides evidence that participants 
engaged with the decisions and made authentic choices. This evidence increases 
the credibility of the experiment’s data and results. 
7.3 Analysis of Decision Data from Cascade Conditions 
Recall that there are three different conditions in the cascade conditions: (a) 
one rating is visible; (b) two ratings are visible and are the same; and (c) three 
ratings are visible, and two ratings are the same and the third is different. Of 
course, in all cascade conditions, the community data suggests a different 
decision than do the ratings. For instance, two ratings may be low, and thus the 
ratings suggest withholding a donation from the nonprofit, but the community 
data shows that the majority of other participants answered that they would 
make a donation. 
My analysis of decision data from cascade conditions begins by investigating 
Hypothesis 1—does community data exert informational influence?—and 
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Hypothesis 3—can herding in social navigation systems be characterized as 
informational cascades? Next, I evaluate the differences between conditions in 
which the community data suggests a Yes decision and the watchdog ratings 
suggest No and conditions in which the community data suggests No and 
watchdog ratings suggest Yes. Finally, I consider how the size and unanimity of 
community data impact participants’ decisions. 
Throughout this discussion, a key measurement is the social influence of the 
community data. This is measured by calculating how often participants made a 
choice that agreed with the community consensus—represented by the 
community data—as compared to how often they made a choice that agreed with 
the ratings. 
7.3.1 Finding: Community Data exerts Information Influence 
Hypothesis 1 states that community data from the social navigation system 
exerted informational influence on users. To verify this hypothesis, it is necessary 
to demonstrate that: 
a. participants’ use of community data is high when they see few ratings; 
b. participants’ use of community data is low when they see many ratings; 
In other words, use of community data inversely correlates with the number of 
ratings that a participant sees. This inverse correlation would show that 
participants are drawing information from the community data when they can 
see fewer ratings and thus have less information. 
Figure 7.2 shows the community data’s social influence for the cascade 
conditions. In this chart and for all charts in this chapter, the data is color-coded 
to denote the number of ratings visible to a participant when he made a decision; 
blue denotes one visible rating, orange denotes two visible ratings, and purple 
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denotes three visible ratings. Figure 7.2 graphs the community data’s size and 
unanimity against the community data’s social influence. 
 An immediate trend is visible from this data: the community data’s social 
influence is strongest when one rating is visible, is weakest when two ratings are 
visible, and is moderately weak when three ratings are visible. To further simplify 
analysis of this data and derive significant results, it is useful to aggregate the 
decision data into two conditions: (a) one visible rating and (b) 2 or 3 visible 
ratings. Clustering conditions into a few distinct categories is common in social 
influence experiments (Baron et al., 1996; Bond & Smith, 1996), and Figure 7.3 
shows the data clustered into these two conditions. In this and other charts in 
this chapter, yellow denotes decision data when either two or three ratings are 
visible. 
Figure 7.2 Comparing social influence in cascade conditions when one, two, or three 
rating are visible. 
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Figure 7.3 shows that (a) when participants saw only one rating and hence had 
less information, they more often made a decision that aligns with the 
community consensus; and (b) when participants saw two or three ratings and 
hence had more information, they more often made a decision that aligns with 
the ratings that they saw. Participants’ use of community data, then, is inversely 
proportional to the amount of other information—watchdog ratings—that they 
had; in effect, the community data was perceived to be a substitute for watchdog 
ratings. Based on this data, I conclude that participants used the community data 
as a form of information, and hence Hypothesis 1 is confirmed: the community 
data exerted informational influence on participants. 
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 aggregate the decision data based on the number of visible 
ratings to make the inverse correlation between social influence and visible 
ratings even clearer. 
Figure 7.3 Comparing social influence in cascade conditions when one rating is 
visible and when two or three ratings are visible. Results show that social influence—
making decisions that agree with the community consensus and disagree with 
rating(s) seen—is stronger when only one rating is visible as compared to when two or 
three ratings are visible. Error bars denote 95% confidence interval. 
115 
 
Figure 7.4 Comparing social influence in cascade conditions when one, two, or three 
ratings are visible. 
Figure 7.5 Comparing social influence in cascade conditions when one rating is 
visible vs. 2 or 3 ratings are visible. 
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Figure 7.4 is analogous to Figure 7.2, and Figure 7.5 is analogous to Figure 7.3 
Figure 7.4 shows the same general trend noted in Figure 7.2: social influence is 
strongest when one rating is visible, is weakest when two ratings are visible, and 
is moderate when three ratings are visible. Figure 7.5 confirms the hypothesis 
that community data exerted informational influence on participants and also 
shows that this hypothesis holds independent of the size and unanimity of 
community data. 
However, characterizing the social influence of the community data as 
informational influence does not account for the observation that social influence 
was stronger in conditions where three ratings were visible as compared to 
conditions where two ratings were visible. This unexpected observation suggests 
that another factor, rather than the number of visible ratings and informational 
influence, is needed to explain these results. I posit that this factor is uncertainty, 
and I posit that there are two causes that can bring about uncertainty in 
participants: (i) uncertainty may arise when some ratings are hidden and (ii) 
uncertainty may arise when watchdog ratings disagree with each other.  
Using the concept of signal strength, it is possible to evaluate the impact of 
uncertainty on a set of ratings; the signal strength of a set of ratings is how 
strongly the ratings suggest a particular decision. Surprisingly, the first cause of 
uncertainty likely increases the signal strength for two visible ratings. When two 
ratings are visible and agree, there are two potential outcomes based on the value 
for the final, hidden rating: (1) the third rating agrees with the two visible ratings 
or (2) or the third rating disagrees, which is equivalent to the scenarios in which 
three ratings are visible. Thus, at worst two ratings provide the same signal 
strength as the three ratings, and at best they provide more. Hence, I argue that 
two ratings have a stronger signal strength than three ratings. The second cause 
of uncertainty—when ratings disagree—likely weakens the signal strength of 
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Figure 7.6 Social influence in cascade conditions organized by the posited signal 
strength for each set of ratings. Posited signal strength includes both the expected 
value of a set of ratings and the uncertainty associated with the ratings. 
three visible ratings because the disagreement in ratings can create doubt in 
participants’ minds about the ratings, the watchdogs’ competence, or the 
nonprofit. 
Regardless of the uncertainty’s cause, positing that the signal strength of two 
ratings is stronger than the signal strength of three ratings can account for these 
results. Figure 7.6 shows a comparison of informational influence compared to 
posited signal strength, and this comparison yields a strong inverse correlation 
between informational influence and the ratings’ signal strength. More 




7.3.2 Finding: Herding in a Social Navigation System can be 
Characterized as Informational Cascades 
Hypothesis 3 argues that the herding in social navigation systems can be 
characterized as informational cascades. Two criteria must be met to argue for 
this hypothesis. First, participants must exhibit cascade behavior; in other words, 
individuals must ignore their own, private information and instead make a 
decision that agrees with the community consensus. In this experiment, the 
private information is the watchdog ratings that participants can see; cascade 
behavior, then, occurs when participants make a decision that agrees with the 
community data and disagrees with the watchdog ratings that they see. The 
second criterion that must be met in order to characterize herding behavior as a 
cascade is that the decision to herd—to ignore private information and go with 
the community’s decision—must be driven by informational influence. 
The data, graphs, and discussion in the previous section provide evidence to 
support these criteria and hence this hypothesis. Recall that all the decision data 
in Figures 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 derive from conditions in which the watchdog 
ratings suggested a different decision than the community data. These 
conditions, then, provided the opportunity for participants to engage in cascade 
behavior—to make a decision that agrees with the community despite seeing 
watchdog ratings that suggest the other decision. Figures 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 
show that participants often engaged in cascade behavior in all cascade 
conditions, even when two or three ratings were visible. The previous section also 
presents substantial evidence that participants’ herding behavior was driven by 
informational influence.  
Thus, analyses of the decision data in the cascades conditions indicate that 
informational cascades can and do occur in social navigation systems and that 
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the herding in social navigation systems can be characterized as informational 
cascades. 
7.3.3 Community Data’s Social Influence Reinforces Bias but does not 
Overcome It 
Figure 7.7 presents decision data for cascade conditions in which the 
community data suggests a Yes decision and the watchdog ratings suggest No, 
and Figure 7.8 presents decision data for conditions in which the community data 
suggests No and watchdog ratings suggest Yes. 
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Figure 7.7 Decision data for cascade trials when community data suggests Yes and 
ratings suggest No. 
Figure 7.8 Decision data for cascade trials when community data suggests No and 
ratings suggest Yes. 
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The decision data in these figures are striking. The data indicates that the 
community data’s social influence decreased markedly when the community data 
suggested a Yes decision as compared to when it suggested a No decision. For 
conditions where the community data suggests Yes, there is not a significant 
difference in social influence between the conditions with one visible rating and 
the conditions with two or three visible ratings. The data, however, is still 
trending such that it is likely that social influence is stronger in conditions with 
one visible rating and compared to conditions with two or three visible ratings. 
Taken together, there is substantial evidence that community data exerts 
informational influence regardless of whether the community data suggests Yes 
or No, but the direction of the community data markedly changes the strength of 
the community data’s influence.  
It is not immediately clear how to interpret these observations because similar 
results have not been found in other social influence or informational cascade 
experiments. The most straightforward explanation is that these results may arise 
due to participants’ strong bias toward answering No and strong bias against 
answering Yes (see Section 7.1.2). In other words, participants may have been 
skeptical of making a Yes decision. Positing that participants were skeptical or 
biased against answering Yes, the social influence that community data exerts 
toward a No choice may indicate that community data reinforces or promotes 
participants’ bias. On the other hand, the very weak social influence that 
community data exerts toward a Yes answer may indicate that community data 
does not overcome participants’ bias. 
These results indicate that the final impact of a social navigation system is the 
product of both the influence a system exerts on users and biases or preferences 
that users bring to the decision making process. Consequently, a system’s 
influence cannot be understood without appreciating the impact of each of these 
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factors, and care should be taken to measure the effect of a system’s community 
data for each choice that a user has in order to separate the influence of a system 
and the influence of biases or preferences. If there is a default, cost-free choice, 
these results indicate the community data may influence users markedly toward 
that choice as compared to other choice. In summary, then, this decision data 
suggests that a system’s community data may interact with characteristics of the 
decision that users are making—such as the presence of a default decision—and 
this interaction may affect users’ final decisions in unexpected ways. 
7.3.4 Analyzing the Impact of Community Data’s Size and Unanimity 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 state that as the size and unanimity of the community data 
increase the social influence that the community data exerts. However, decision 
data from the cascade conditions presents a more complex picture. Table 7.2 
presents statistical significance values that depict main effects for the three 
independent variables—ratings configuration, community data size, and 
community data unanimity—on the community data’s social influence. The table 
presents significance values for three condition sets: all cascade conditions, 
cascade conditions in which the community data suggests Yes and the ratings 
suggest No, and cascade conditions in which the community data suggests No 
and the ratings suggest Yes. 
The data in Table 7.2 is compelling. The strong main effect of the ratings 
Table 7.2 Significance values for decision data from cascade conditions for ratings 







All Cascade Conditions p < 0.00001 p < 0.05 p < 0.08 
Cascade Conditions: CD 
Yes, ratings No 
p < 0.001 --- p < 0.01 
Cascade Conditions: CD 
No, ratings Yes 
p < 0.00001 --- p < 0.03 
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configuration on social influence is to be expected given community data exerted 
informational influence on participants. 
However, the main effect for community data’s size and unanimity is relatively 
weak. The size of the community data had a main effect (p < 0.05) on 
participants’ decisions across all cascade conditions but did not have a main 
effect for either subset of conditions. The community data’s size had a main effect 
in the set of all cascade conditions when comparing the small size (5 people) to 
the large size (35 people); no effect was found between small and medium size 
nor between medium and large size. Given that there was a main effect of the size 
overall, it is likely that the number of conditions in the subsets prevented the 
community data’s size from yielding a main effect in these subsets. Additional 
conditions may confirm that size yields a main effect on the community data’ 
social influence for each of the subsets of conditions as well. 
The main effect of the community data’s unanimity shows an interesting 
pattern. The main effect overall is quite weak and could even be considered 
insignificant. However, the significance is much stronger in each of the subsets, 
and the strongest significance occurs in the cascade conditions set where the 
community data suggests a Yes decision and the ratings suggest No. These 
findings complement the previous discussion about the impact of community 
data on participants’ skepticism. 
No main effect on social influence was found for either the size or unanimity of 
community data for particular rating conditions, but the trends within some 
conditions suggested that a larger number of trials could yield an effect. 
7.4 Analysis of Decision Data from Non-Cascade Conditions 
In non-cascade conditions, the watchdog ratings and community data agree 
and suggest the same choice. The three conditions that comprise the non-cascade 
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conditions are (A) three ratings visible: two ratings are the same and the third 
rating differs; (B) two ratings are visible and are assigned different values; and 
(C) one rating is visible. In conditions A and C, the community data agrees with 
the ratings, and in condition B, the ratings are neutral and the community data is 
randomly assigned a direction. 
I employ a different metric to investigate decision data from non-cascade 
conditions as compared to the metric I used to investigate cascade conditions. 
The principal metric that I employ for non-cascade conditions is how often 
participants’ made a decision that agreed with the suggested choice. I refer the 
suggested choice as the expected choice, and I refer to the other choice as the 
unexpected choice. 
My analysis of the decision data from non-cascade conditions parallels my 
analysis for the cascade conditions. I first discuss trends in the data based on the 
number of visible ratings. Next, I discuss differences between conditions in which 
the suggested decision is Yes and conditions in which the suggested decision is 
No. Finally, I discuss the impact of the community data’s size and unanimity on 
decisions made in non-cascade conditions. 
7.4.1 Findings: Social Influence Strength and Egocentric Discounting 
Figure 7.9 shows the decision data for non-cascade conditions, and Figure 7.10 
shows the decision data aggregated by the number of ratings that participants 
saw. There is a clear and significant trend in the data: participants make the 
expected decision—the decision that the ratings and the community data 
suggest—most often in condition A, when they saw all three ratings. In addition, 
participants made the expected decision more often in condition C, when they 
saw a single rating than in condition B, when they saw two split ratings. 
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Figure 7.9 Social influence in conditions when one, two, or three watchdog ratings are visible 
and the ratings suggest the same decision as the community data. When two ratings are 
visible, they are split and the direction of the community data is assigned randomly; when 
three ratings are visible, the ratio is always two in one direction and one in the opposite 
direction. 
Figure 7.10 Social influence across conditions when one, two, or three watchdog ratings are 
visible and the ratings suggest the same decision as the community data. Influence is 
measured across community data sizes and strengths. 
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Decision data for condition B, where two ratings are visible but are different, 
offers a unique and clear measurement of the social influence that the community 
data exerted on participants. Because the ratings were split, they offered no 
guidance for a decision, and thus participants likely based their decision on the 
community data. Overall, participants chose the expected decision in 60% of the 
conditions for condition B, and thus the social influence of community data is, on 
average, about 10%. 
It is useful to compare decision data from condition A, where participants saw 
a single rating, with decision data from conditions B and C. Participants chose the 
suggested answer 13% more often in condition A than they did in condition B, 
and 25% more often in condition C than in condition B.  
These decision data indicate that, because the community data and rating 
suggest the same decision, they are additive in strength, and previous research of 
social influence in nonprofit giving employs an additive perspective for multiple 
information sources as well (Croson & Shang, 2008). From an additive 
perspective, decision data from condition B is the sum of social influence and a 
single rating, and condition C is the sum of social influence and two ratings. 
Based on this analysis, the strength of a single rating is about 13%. This can be 
verified because the difference between conditions A and B and between B and C 
is a single rating; in both instances, the percentage of difference is about 13%. 
In summary, the strength of the community data’s social influence is about 
10% and the strength of a single rating is about 13%. This data supports 
Hypothesis 2: participants engaged in egocentric discounting, valuing a single 
rating more highly than the totality of the community data. Of course, it follows 
that participants valued a set of ratings more highly than the community data as 
well. 
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Decision data from the non-cascade conditions can provide insight into the 
data that might be expected from control conditions in which participants saw 
only watchdog ratings. Because a single rating exerted about 13% influence on 
participants’ decisions, it is expected that participants would choose the 
suggested answer in about 63% of the trials in which a single rating is visible. 
Similarly, because a set of three ratings with a 2 to 1 ratio exerted about 26% 
influence on participants’ decisions, it is expected that participants would choose 
the suggested answer in about 76% of the trials in which three ratings are visible. 
Lastly, for a condition in which two ratings are visible and agree, it is expected 
that participants would choose the suggested answer in more than 76% of the 
trials. 
Further support for these predicted decision data in control conditions can be 
found from the cascade trials’ decision data. In particular, recall that the signal 
strength of one, two, and three ratings is discussed and that the decision data 
suggests that the signal strength of one rating is weakest, the strength of two 
ratings that agree is strongest, and the strength of three ratings with a 2-1 ratio is 
moderately strong. These relative signal strengths match both the decision data 
in the non-cascade conditions and the predicted decision data for the control 
conditions. 
Hence, decision data in both the cascade and non-cascade trials indicates that 
the sets of ratings used in this experiment can be ordered ordinally. In particular, 
the data shows that the strength of rating sets, from strongest to weakest, is: 
i. two ratings, ratio 2-0 (ratings agree); 
ii. three ratings, ratio 2-1 (two ratings agree, one disagrees); 
iii. one rating, ratio 1-0; 
iv. two ratings, ratio 1-1 (ratings disagree). 
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Because ordinality amongst sets is likely a function of information, ordinality 
amongst rating sets provides a means to compare information content across 
rating sets without knowing the information content of particular ratings. 
Ordinality, then, reduces the need for collecting decision data from traditional 
control conditions but provides hypotheses should control conditions be studied. 
Lastly, by ordering ratings sets ordinally based on their influence on users’ 
decisions, it is possible to foster a relationship between set ordinality and the 
strength of the community’s data social influence. This relationship provides 
another perspective from which to argue that community data exerts 
informational influence rather than normative influence. The decision data from 
the cascade trials show that the community data’s social influence increases as 
the rating sets’ ordinality decreases. Because ordinality is likely based on 
information content, Figure 7.6 can be interpreted as the relationship between 
the community data’s social influence and the rating sets’ ordinality. Figure 7.6, 
then, shows that the more information/influence a ratings set contains/exerts, 
the less influence the community data has. This is another perspective by which 
to establish informational influence of community data.  
7.4.2 Differences between Suggesting Yes and Suggesting No 
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 show decision data for the non-cascade conditions when 
the suggested decision was Yes and when the suggested decision was No. Figures 
7.13 and 7.14 show the decision data broken down by community size and 
unanimity as well as condition. As was true in the cascade conditions, 





Figure 7.12 Decision data for non-cascade conditions when expected decision is Yes. 
Figure 7.11 Decision data for non-cascade conditions when expected decision is No. 
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Figure 7.13 Decision data based on community data size and unanimity for non-
cascade conditions when expected decision is No. 
Figure 7.14 Decision data based on community data size and unanimity for non-
cascade conditions when expected decision is Yes. 
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    Figure 7.11 shows that participants nearly always follow the suggested decision 
when the suggestion is No regardless of the condition. This data provides 
additional evidence that the domain and decision structure for this experiment 
substantially impact the decision data. Because participants’ are so strongly 
biased toward choosing No, any data that reinforces this bias overwhelmingly 
leads to decisions of No. What is particularly interesting about the conditions in 
which the data suggests a No decision is that the community data’s size and 
unanimity exert no significant effect because the data is so overwhelmingly 
skewed toward No decisions. Hence, Figures 7.11 and 7.13 are striking in their 
uniformity. 
Figures 7.12 and 7.14 show that nearly all of the differences between the non-
cascade conditions arise from conditions in which the suggested decision is Yes. 
That is, the overall trend in the decision data for non-cascade conditions—
participants are most likely to choose the suggested answer when they see three 
ratings or, slightly less so, when they a single rating, but participants are much 
less likely to choose the suggested answer when they see two ratings that 
disagree—is apparent in the decision data for conditions in which the suggested 
choice is Yes but not for conditions in which the suggested choice is No. 
7.4.3 Analyzing the of Impact of Community Data’s Size and 
Unanimity 
Table 7.3 provides statistical significance values for the ratings configuration, 
the size of community data, and the unanimity of community data for the three 
condition sets discussed: all non-cascade conditions, non-cascade conditions 
when the suggested answer was Yes, and non-cascade conditions when the 
suggested answer was No. As was true for cascade trials, community data 
unanimity exerted a much stronger effect on participants’ decisions than did 
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Table 7.3 ANOVA analysis of factors for non-cascade conditions. 
 Ratings 
Configuration 
Size Strength Interactions 
All Noncascade 
Conditions 
p < 0.00001 --- p < 003 size & strength: 




p < 0.00001 --- p < 0.1 size & strength: 




p < 0.01 --- ---  
 
community data size. In fact, community data size did not exert a significant 
effect on participants’ decisions. Community data unanimity exerted a main 
effect on all non-cascade conditions and conditions where the suggested answer 
was Yes.  
Finally, there is a slight interaction effect between the size and unanimity of 
the community data (Figure 7.15) for these two condition sets as well. This is a 
compelling finding as it suggests that size and unanimity are not independent. 
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Figure 7.15 Rates of conformity when participants saw two ratings, each of which 
had a different value. Interaction effect occurs when both community data size and 
unanimity are high. Interaction effect significance is p < 0.03, error bars are p < 0.1 
 
7.5 Summary 
The decision data from this experiment provided varying levels of support for 
my hypotheses about the social navigation user experience. The data strongly 
supports Hypotheses 1 and 3: (1) community data exerted informational 
influence on participants and (2) the herding behavior that arises due to 
community data is best characterized as informational cascades. In the cascade 
conditions, when participants saw fewer watchdog ratings, they chose to make a 
decision that agreed with the community data more often than in conditions 
when they saw more ratings.  
The inverse correlation between the number of ratings seen and the strength of 
social influence that the community data exerted provides strong evidence that 
community data exerts informational influence on participants. The cascade 
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conditions also demonstrated herding behavior—individuals ignoring watchdog 
ratings that they saw and instead making a decision that agreed with the 
community data. Because community data exerts informational influence, this 
herding behavior is best characterized as informational cascade behavior. 
 Despite these findings, my analysis of the decision data in the cascade 
conditions indicates that another factor is needed to explain why informational 
influence is not higher when two ratings are visible as compared to when three 
ratings are visible. I have argued that participants’ uncertainty is the factor that is 
most likely to explain these observations. 
Analysis of the non-cascade decision data provides tentative support for 
Hypothesis 2, egocentric discounting. The data shows that the social influence of 
community data led to a 10% increase in participants choosing the suggested 
answer, the influence of a single rating led to a 13% increase in participants 
choosing the suggested answer, and the influence of three ratings with a 2:1 ratio 
led to a 25% increase in participants choosing the suggested answer. While this 
analysis does not conclusively demonstrate egocentric influence because 
participants did not make an initial and final guess, it does indicate that 
participants value their personal information more highly than they value the 
community data. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5, which posit that the size and unanimity of community 
data correlate with its social influence strength, met with mix results. Community 
data size proved to be a significant effect only in the sum of all cascade 
conditions, and size was not a significant factor in either subset of cascade 
conditions. Community data unanimity exerted a significant effect in both 
cascade and non-cascade conditions and in all subsets except when in non-
cascade conditions in which the suggested answer is No. There was also an 
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interaction effect between community size and unanimity in non-cascade 
conditions when the suggested answer was Yes. 
In general, the factors that influenced participants’ decisions most strongly 
were the agreement or disagreement between the watchdog ratings and 
community data (cascade vs. non-cascade conditions) and the direction of the 
community data (in cascade conditions) or the direction of the suggested decision 
(in non-cascade conditions). Community data unanimity also was a significant 
factor in participants’ decisions. Community data size, however, was a minor or 
insignificant factor in participants’ decisions. 
Finally, the experiment’s decision data indicates that participants exhibited a 
bias toward a No decision. In cascade conditions, where the ratings and 
community data suggested different decisions, the data indicates that community 
data reinforces participants’ bias toward answering No but does little to help 
overcome this bias to answer Yes. The decision data for non-cascade conditions 
showed the same pattern as in the cascade conditions, and hence this finding is 
both strong and robust. This finding demonstrates that a social navigation 
system’s impact on users’ decisions is mediated by biases, preferences, and 
incentives that users bring to the decision making process. Hence, when 
investigating a system’s impact, it is useful to identify and separate the influence 





CHAPTER 8  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESIGN, USE, AND EVALUATION OF 
SOCIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 
 
The previous chapters in this thesis have described, discussed, and analyzed 
the social navigation user experience. This chapter employs the social navigation 
user experience perspective to discuss improvements to the design, use, and 
evaluation of social navigation systems. 
There are two major foci in this chapter. First, I argue that in domains where 
people make use of objective information—information that is independent of 
personal preferences—to make decisions, social navigation systems should 
operate on objective information rather than decisions or opinions. The concept 
of social navigation systems for objective information can improve the design 
and use of systems by focusing efforts on supporting the capture, aggregation, 
and representation of knowledge. 
Second, I discuss a general evaluation method for social navigation systems 
that can measure the social influence of a system’s community data. This method 
can be employed to measure and compare the social influence and impact of 
social navigation systems on users’ decisions across systems, domains, and 
disciplines. There are, however, limitations to this method. The method cannot 
determine what decisions users are most likely to encounter and, consequently, 
what type of impact a social navigation system is most likely to have on users’ 
decisions. 
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8.1 Improving the Design of Social Navigation Systems 
Findings from the nonprofit choice experiment (Chapter 7) show that 
community data exerts informational influence on users when they make 
decisions. That is, users perceive community data as a source of knowledge or 
information. This perspective can be applied to understand (a) how the use of 
social navigation systems differs between subjective and objective domains and 
(b) how social navigation systems can better support users’ decisions by focusing 
on information rather than decisions. 
8.1.1 Social Navigation Systems for Subjective and Objective Domains 
Traditionally, social navigation systems have been applied to domains such as 
music, movies, recipes, and books. These are taste-based or subjective domains, 
and the defining characteristic of these domains is that users make decisions 
based on personal preferences. Personal preferences have two very compelling 
qualities. First, everyone has preferences, and those preferences can never be 
wrong. Second, it is easy for an individual to understand what others know when 
they hold a preference for an item; that is not to say that an individual 
understands exactly why other people hold a preference, but that she can 
empathize with what it is like to hold that preference because she too has 
preferences for similar items. 
In contrast, objective domains are domains where users employ objective 
information as well as other information sources. Objective information is 
information that is independent of personal preferences and thus can be agreed 
upon by multiple people regardless of their preferences. Examples of objective 
domains include security management, finances, and health. Consider an 
example from the security management domain: a particular software application 
produces unwanted popup windows when browsing the Internet, and hence it is 
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malware. This information—that a software application is spyware—is an 
instance of objective information because it is true regardless of personal 
preferences. In the nonprofit choice experiment, the experiment’s structure 
framed watchdog ratings as objective information as well; regardless of a 
participant’s personal preferences, a watchdog’s rating was constant. 
Two factors complicate conceptualization of objective domains. First, 
individuals often interpret objective information by applying their personal 
preferences to interpret the information. Hence, the impact of watchdog ratings 
differed among participants in the nonprofit choice experiment; some 
participants chose No whenever they saw a low rating, but others chose No only if 
they believed that the majority of ratings were low. Another complicating factor 
about objective information is that it can change. The potential plasticity of 
objective information was not addressed in the nonprofit choice experiment, but 
it is a complicating factor in conceptualizing objective information. For instance, 
nutritional and health information is under constant revision, yet at any 
particular point in time, the current information is considered to be “correct.” 
Social navigation systems have been applied much less often to objective 
domains. Acumen and Bonfire are early examples of how social navigation 
systems can be applied to objective domains. Recently, social navigation systems 
have been introduced to other objective domains. For instance, WebMD26 now 
enables users to rate and review prescription drugs. 
There is clearly a need, then, to better understand how social navigation 
systems can support user decision making in objective domains. Based on my 
work with Acumen and Bonfire and findings from the nonprofit experiment, 





social navigation systems applied to objective domains should focus on the 
capture, aggregation, and representation of objective information. While these 
foci may also be useful to consider when applying social navigation systems to 
subjective domains, they are likely less important in subjective domains. I discuss 
these foci in the following section. 
8.1.2 Social Navigation Systems for Objective Information 
I have argued that, in an objective domain, a social navigation system should 
aggregate objective information rather than personal opinions. Social navigation 
systems for information are distinct from social navigation for opinions in many 
ways; one important difference is that social navigation systems for information 
pose unique challenges in areas of capturing, personalizing and representing 
information to support decision making. 
Recall that a key difference between personal preferences and objective 
information is that individuals always possess preferences but do not always 
possess information. Moreover, users employ personal preferences when making 
decisions in taste-based domains, but individuals do not always employ 
knowledge or information when making decisions in objective domains. As 
demonstrated in the nonprofit experiment, individuals often ignore information 
they have access to—watchdog ratings—and follow the community consensus 
instead. 
This behavior causes considerable problems in social navigation systems. 
Users lacking information or who are unsure of information they have access to 
often use community data for guidance. Naturally, uncertain users frequently 
choose to follow the community consensus, and their decision is added to the 
system’s community data. However, subsequent users viewing the community 
data often assume the data derives from users that have employed information to 
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make decisions rather than users who have followed the community consensus. If 
enough users misinterpret community data this way, an informational cascade 
forms. Informational cascades lead to a false majority within a social navigation 
system, and the system’s community data does not accurately reflect the 
community’s knowledge. Cascades, of course, can persist for some time and can 
lead users to many suboptimal decisions. 
Based on this behavior, the first challenge for a social navigation system 
applied to an objective domain is to distinguish between the capture of objective 
information and the capture of decisions. Due to informational influence and 
cascades, the objective information that a system captures can be markedly 
different than the decisions that it captures. Capturing information is more 
valuable than capturing decisions; captured information helps individuals make 
more informed decisions whereas captured decisions can lead users to many 
different choices, some of which are informed and others of which are 
misinformed27.  
After a social navigation system captures objective information, the next step is 
to aggregate that information. In taste-based domains, many social navigation 
systems use a collaborative filtering (CF) algorithm (Resnick et al., 1994) to 
provide personalized output. Because social navigation systems in taste-based 
domains attempt to produce output that matches users’ personal preferences as 
closely as possible, a personalization algorithm is ideal because data that arises 
                                                   
 
 
27 There is, however, a caveat: there are instances in which others’ decisions, regardless of whether 
they are based on knowledge or not, are valuable information for individuals making their own 
decision. When there are shared resources at stake—such as in instances when a tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin, 1968) might occur—or one’s use of a item impacts another use of a similar 
item [i.e. the “network effect” (Uzzi, 1996)], then one’s decision may well depend on the decisions 
of others rather than the knowledge of others. 
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from other people with preferences dissimilar to an individual’s preferences can 
often be ignored. 
However, it is not at all clear that personalizing information based on an 
individual’s preferences is advantageous for supporting decisions in objective 
domains. A personalization algorithm aggregates community data so as to skew it 
towards a user’s interests, but many difficulties arise when attempting to 
personalize objective information that do not arise when personalizing 
preferences. It is not clear that objective information—which I have defined to be 
independent of users’ preferences—should be personalized based on a users’ 
preferences. Information can be valuable if it runs counter to a user’s preferences, 
and in fact may be quite valuable in such instances because it can prompt a user 
to reevaluate his preferences. Employing personalization algorithms on captured 
information also runs the risk of the algorithms ignoring some information and 
emphasizing other information too much, and it is unclear how often a 
personalization algorithm can emphasize and cull objective information to match 
a user’s needs. 
In addition, a personalization algorithm for objective information may have to 
enable users to understand what information was aggregated, how it was 
aggregated, and how it be disaggregated in the event that a user wants to see the 
original information or determine whether the personalization process matches 
the method she would prefer to use to aggregate the information. 
The final challenge of a social navigation system is credibly representing user 
information and knowledge in the community data. In the nonprofit choice 
experiment, some of the difficulty in overcoming participants’ skepticism and 
getting them to answer Yes can likely be attributed to the doubt that they had 
about others’ decisions. In addition, Acumen’s users expressed doubt about the 
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credibility of the system’s experts/mavens, and skepticism of experts as 
compared the complete community of users has been replicated in other 
experiments as well (Chen, 2008; Senecal & Nantel, 2004).  
Doubt about others’ information or knowledge and, subsequently, their 
decisions can arise from many different sources. An individual may doubt that 
others have information or knowledge that they do not, or he may doubt that 
others used their information or knowledge to make informed decisions. This 
doubt about the community data often reduces the social influence of the 
community data, and hence this effect runs counter to the cascade effect that is 
created by capturing decisions rather than knowledge. Nonetheless, people often 
still engage in cascade behavior, indicating that doubt about others’ information 
or knowledge does not completely mitigate the social influence of community 
data. In summary, then, multiple individual and contextual factors play a role in 
determining the strength of social influence that a system’s community data 
exerts during an individual’s decision making process. 
8.1.3 Capturing Objective Information and Mitigating Informational 
Cascades 
While there are numerous challenges that surround the processing of objective 
information in social navigation systems, capturing information is likely the most 
salient one because it can mitigate informational cascades in social navigation 
systems substantially. Moreover, because informational cascades occur in social 
navigation systems applied to both objective and taste-based domains, more 
effective capturing of information could benefit all social navigation systems. 
Irrespective of whether personalization is desirable, cascades cannot be 
mitigated by simply by using more complex social navigation systems. As Chapter 
3 discusses, all types of social navigation systems are susceptible to herding and 
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cascade behavior. By presenting community data, irrespective of what algorithm 
was used to aggregate it, a social navigation system becomes susceptible to 
cascades due to the informational influence that its community data exerts. 
In this section, I discuss two methods for potentially mitigating cascades: via 
algorithmic strategies and via user interaction techniques. Given the challenges 
associated with using algorithmic strategies to mitigate herding, I argue for a 
novel approach to mitigation that employs user interaction. Ultimately, these 
approaches will likely prove complementary. 
8.1.3.1 Mitigating Cascades via Algorithms 
Recent research demonstrates that algorithmic approaches can yield a 
manipulation-resistant recommender system by limiting the influence of users 
whose ratings have proven to be inaccurate and thus potentially malicious 
(Resnick & Sami, 2007). Similarly, there is algorithmic research on networks that 
has studied where to place detectors to identify cascades in the network 
(Leskovec et al., 2007) and how best to start cascades (Domingos & Richardson, 
2001). 
While these approaches provide a foundation for approaching cascade 
mitigation via algorithms, it is unclear how applicable they are to mitigating 
cascades in social navigation systems. Many informational cascades are started 
inadvertently and not through manipulation, and there is no evidence that 
particular individuals start cascades more often than others. Moreover, it is 
unclear whether a network perspective is appropriate for social navigation 
systems.  
Putting these concerns aside, the question is whether an algorithm might be 
able to identify cascade behavior and discount it, leading to a more accurate 
depiction of the community’s “best guess.” The answer to this question is unclear. 
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Algorithmic approaches require substantial amounts of data in order to be 
effective, which means that a system must be actively collecting data for a long 
time before it becomes effective. Many privacy and security decisions, however, 
cannot or should not be deferred, as new threats often arise quickly and do 
significant damage in their early stages. For such threats, community data is 
needed immediately rather than later. 
Thus, there are difficult tradeoffs between (a) requiring users to make unaided 
decisions and collecting but hiding this data for a period of time in order to 
ensure the community data is accurate and (b) showing users limited, potentially 
inaccurate community data from the start, which will sometimes improve their 
decisions but also occasionally lead to cascades that have significant negative 
consequences. 
Another distinct weakness of using history-based data to compute on 
community data is that users must maintain stable identities in order to 
determine which, if any, users are most likely to start or propagate cascades. This 
weakness requires consideration of another tradeoff: users must forfeit some 
measure of privacy in order to improve the accuracy of community data so that it 
is useful for decision making. 
Using a reputation system (Resnick et al., 2000) could incentivize users to 
forego some measure of privacy in order to build and maintain a reputation for 
making good decisions. The challenge for such a system is developing appropriate 
incentives to reward good decisions and a good reputation. 
8.1.3.2 Mitigating Cascades via User Interaction 
A promising—and so far unexplored—avenue of research is to mitigate 
cascades via user interfaces techniques. The general goal of these techniques 
should be to balance two competing goals: (a) enabling users to leverage 
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community data and (b) capturing user information and expertise in order to 
provide more accurate community data and thus mitigate informational 
cascades.  
Today’s social navigation systems afford easy use of community data but 
sacrifice accuracy. In contrast, imagine a user interface that afford somewhat 
limited use of community data in order to ensure that a system can capture some 
measure of users’ information or knowledge during decision making and hence 
maintain the accuracy of the system’s community data. 
For example, instead of displaying a system’s community data, a user interface 
could provide an additional choice labeled “go with the community decision” 
alongside other choices. If a user chose to go with the community decision, her 
decision would be the community’s consensus; more importantly, her decision 
would not be added to the system’s community data because the decision does 
not contribute new information to the system.  
Another option is a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the 
interface would present a user with her potential choices but not show any 
community data. Making a choice would lead her to the second stage, where the 
interface would show the community data and allow her to change her decision if 
she wants. In this design, the user’s initial decision would be included in the 
community data because it is uninfluenced by community data. 
Of course, these approaches are quite rudimentary and rigid, and it is unclear 
whether users would accept and acclimate to more restricted and less 
straightforward uses of community data. However, they demonstrate the 
potential of an informational cascades perspective to inform the design of novel 
interfaces for social navigation applied to privacy and security management. 
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Table 8.1 Characteristics of community data. 
 Collection User Burden Aggregation Information 
Capture 
Activity Data Implicit Low Easy Low 
Ratings Explicit Moderate Easy Moderate 
Free Text Explicit High Hard High 
Tagging Explicit Moderate  Moderate Moderate-High 
 
It is also worthwhile to consider how different types of community data impact 
the frequency of cascades. Table 8.1 characterizes four popular types of 
community data—activity or behavioral data, ratings, free text, and tagging—
along four dimensions: (a) whether the collection of data require explicit actions 
by users; (b) the degree of user burden in collecting the data; (c) the difficulty in 
aggregating the information; and (d) the ability of the type to capture information 
or knowledge. 
The information capture trait characterizes how much information the data 
type conveys to users; more expressive data conveys more information and thus 
is easier to understand and use. There is a correlation between the ability of a 
data type to capture information and the likelihood of informational cascades 
occurring: the more information captured, the less likely informational cascades 
are to occur because it is easier to understand why a user made a particular 
decision. This is an important correlation. 
Characterizing community data types by their level of information capture 
helps explain findings from Acumen and Bonfire. The cascades that occurred in 
Acumen are partially a result of its use of activity data. Bonfire’s use of both 
activity data and tagging was well received because those data types complement 
each other. Activity data is simple and always present, and tagging can 
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complement the activity data by providing a more expressive form of data, albeit 
at the cost of an increased burden on users. 
What can be learned from this characterization of community data is that there 
are tradeoffs in choosing to use different types of community data. Activity data 
and free text lie on opposite ends of a spectrum in which the tradeoff is between 
ease of collection & aggregation and expressiveness & cascade mitigation. Activity 
data is very easy to collect and aggregate but has very low expressiveness and 
hence is likely to cause more cascades. In contrast, free text is difficult to collect 
because it places a high burden on users and is hard to aggregate, but it is very 
expressive and is less likely to lead to cascades. Ratings and tagging occupy the 
middle of this spectrum, and the difficultly in collecting and aggregating these 
data types is commensurate with their expressiveness and likelihood of 
preventing cascades. 
Another tradeoff to consider when choosing the types of community data to 
use in a social navigation system for privacy or security management is users’ 
motivation. The higher the user burden that a system places on users, the more 
motivation is needed for users to contribute data. Thus, it is important to choose 
a community data type that matches users’ motivation. There are many potential 
methods to motivate users, including direct payment, reputation building, game 
playing, and public service. 
8.2 A General Approach for Evaluating the Social Influence of Social 
Navigation Systems 
The experimental design employed in the nonprofit choice experiment is 
largely agnostic toward both system functionality and domain. As such, it can 
serve to inform a general approach for evaluating social navigation systems 
applied to domains where users employ objective information to make decisions. 
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This approach can measure the strength and type of social influence for a social 
navigation system’s community data, the strength of influence imparted by 
particular facets of community data (e.g. size, unanimity, personalization), and 
the strength of influence for particular vectors of community data (i.e. influence 
based on the directionality of community data). 
Four steps summarize this general evaluation approach: 
(1) identify the decision that the social navigation system will support and the 
most influential information source(s) in a domain; 
(2) develop a framework to systematically vary and provide incomplete and 
imperfect objective information to participants; 
(3) identify critical and contrasting decision points in the space of objective 
information and community data; 
(4) analyze decision data from the chosen decision points to measure: 
a. the type and strength for the community data’s social influence; 
b. the strength of influence that characteristics of community data (e.g. 
size, unanimity, expertise, personalization) impart; 
c. the strength of the community data’s social influence based on its 
directionality; 
Using an example drawn from the health domain, I discuss each of these steps in 
turn. Finally, I discuss the benefits and limitations of this framework. 
8.2.1 Identifying a Decision and the Most Influential Information 
Sources 
The first step in preparing to evaluate a social navigation system in a domain 
with objective information is to identify the decision that the system will aid and 
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the objective information sources that users may employ when making this 
decision. In the nonprofit choice experiment, the decision supported is whether 
to make an online donation to a nonprofit organization. It is best if there are 
relative few choices for the decision, and an important feature of a decision is 
whether there is a default or cost-free choice. The nonprofit choice experiment 
employed a decision with a cost-free choice; in contrast, when an individual is 
choosing between two new restaurants, there is no default or cost-free choice. I 
discuss how the presence of a default choice impacts the evaluation below.  
The example decision employed during this discussion is whether to start 
taking particular vitamin supplements. This is the general decision type, and each 
particular decision in the experiment would ask participants to decide whether 
they would take a particular supplement. This decision has a default, cost-free 
choice: to continue to abstain from taking any supplements. 
In additional to identifying the decision to support, it is necessary to identify 
one or two information sources that individuals often employ to make the 
decision. In the nonprofit choice experiment, participants had access to a single 
information source—watchdog ratings—that donors frequently employ when 
deciding whether to make a charitable donation. For the vitamin supplements 
example, it is assumed that individuals use information from news articles to 
decide whether to start taking a supplement. 
8.2.2 Developing a Framework for Providing Incomplete Information 
In order to distinguish between normative and informational influence, 
participants must hold the beliefs that (a) they have incomplete or potentially 
inaccurate information and (b) that other people may have information that they 
do not. When individuals hold these beliefs, they have motivation to seek out 
information from the community data, thereby creating the opportunity for 
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community data to exert informational influence. Of course, the primary 
motivation for a decision will determine whether community data exerts 
normative or informational influence. 
Informational cascade experiments and social influence experiments use 
different techniques to impart these beliefs. In informational cascade 
experiments, the standard way to impart these beliefs is to enable participants to 
select and privately view one piece of information from amongst three pieces of 
equal information; participants quickly come to understand that each individual 
has a random and incomplete piece of information (Anderson & Holt, 2006). In 
social influence experiments, these beliefs are imparted simply by virtue of 
observing others’ decisions; the experiment is often set up so that others’ 
decisions conflicts with or casts doubt on the expected choice.  
In the nonprofit choice experiment, I drew from both types of experiments to 
convince participants that they have incomplete information and that others may 
have complementary information. A series of examples at the beginning of the 
nonprofit experiment imparts these beliefs by creating the expectation that 
watchdog ratings may be temporarily unavailable for standard reasons, and 
hence participants may see only one or two ratings rather than all ratings. 
Descriptions of the watchdog ratings and community data reinforce the potential 
unavailability of ratings and the potential for different participants to see 
different ratings. In addition, many of the scenarios (decision points) in the 
experiment cast doubt on the expected choice by providing contradictory 
information. 
Imparting these beliefs on individuals is easier in real-world situations because 
individuals can readily imagine information that others may have. However, it is 
difficult to impart this belief in an experimental setting because an experimental 
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setting is constrained, and thus participants can often anticipate information 
sources and availability more easily. It was especially difficult to impart these 
beliefs in the nonprofit experiment because an experiment administrator was not 
present to answer and clarify questions. To effectively impart these beliefs, I 
performed numerous pilot studies of the nonprofit choice experiment to refine (i) 
the flow of and language in the initial examples and (ii) descriptions of the ratings 
and community data in the trials themselves. Imparting these beliefs is necessary 
for the experiment to succeed, and hence this step cannot be overemphasized. 
In the running example for choosing vitamin supplements, the most 
reasonable approach is to mirror nonprofit ratings by constraining the 
information in the experiment to be three Yes (take the supplement) or No (do 
not take the supplement) recommendations that are derived from three 
newspaper articles. In each decision trial, then, a participant would see the 
recommendation(s) from one or more articles. A more complex experiment 
might add a unanimity component to the recommendation (e.g. “70% of people 
benefit from taking this supplement”), an element of risk to the recommendation 
(e.g. “recommended, but 33% of people experience minor negative effects from 
taking the supplement), or use different media to convey the information (e.g. 
print vs. video). 
8.2.3 Identifying Critical and Contrasting Decision Points 
The next step in the general experimental method is to identify decision points 
from which to collect decision data. Identifying decision points is accomplished 
by mapping out the space of possible decision points and then selecting 
important decision points. 
Two sets of independent variables define the decision space: the objective 
information and the facets of community data to be studied. Within this space are 
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decision points that will serve as scenarios. Figure 8.1 shows the decision space 
for the nonprofit choice experiment. There are three axes: objective information 
(watchdog ratings), community data size, and community data unanimity. Three 
decision points are labeled in Figure 8.1 which illustrate different points in the 
space. At point 1, there is much objective information but very limited 
community data; the information and community data agree or suggest the same 
decision. At point 2, there is little objective information, much subjective 
information, and the information and data again agree. Finally, at point 3, there 
is limited objective information and community data, and the information and 
data disagree (hence the negative value of information and positive value of 
community data).  
The decision space in Figure 8.1 can be adapted to other decisions and 
domains. This decision space depicts a single type of objective information, but 
multiple axes could be used for experiments where there are multiple types of 
objective information. The community data axes can be adapted to map out any 
attributes or presentation of community data. 
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There are three types of important decision points: baseline, critical and 
contrasting. For baseline points, participants should see only objective 
information and not community data. Decision data from baseline points provide 
the signal strength of the information, and this signal strength can later be 
compared to the social influence of the community data. Critical decision points 
are those that present difficult or unique decisions to participants. Contrasting 
decision points employ different values for a characteristic of the community 
data, such as the size or unanimity of community data. Decision data from 
contrasting decision points can be used to investigate the impact of a community 
data characteristic. 
In the nonprofit choice experiment, I identified critical decisions as (i) those 
where the community data suggested one decision and the ratings suggested 
another decision and (ii) those where the suggested decision was Yes rather than 
No. These are generally good decision points for which to gather data. Comparing 








Figure 8.1 Decision space for nonprofit choice experiment. 
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disagree makes it possible to determine whether the community data is exerting 
normative or informational influence. Comparing decision data for points in 
which a particular choice is suggested affords measurement of the community 
data’s strength of social influence for different choices. 
There are many different attributes of community data that might impact its 
effect on decision making. Data from the nonprofit experiment shows that both 
size and unanimity exert an effect on people’s decisions, but a full understanding 
of how the spectrum of sizes and unanimity impact people’s decisions requires 
additional decision data. Another common attribute of community data is 
personalization; it is unclear when and for what circumstances personalizing 
community data increases its impact. Finally, user interfaces that display recent 
data and trends within the community data are also fruitful facets to explore. 
Let us return to our example, where a social navigation system is to help users 
decide whether to take new vitamin supplements. The critical decision points for 
this experiment should mirror those of the nonprofit experiment. Decision data 
should be collected when the available information and community data disagree, 
both when the community data suggests Yes and when it No. Decision data 
should also be collected when the community data and available information 
disagree and for both possible choices.  
Selecting attributes of community data to evaluate is more subjective. Because 
there are so many small nonprofits, it is expected that most nonprofits would 
likely have limited community data. Hence, the nonprofit choice experiment 
collected decision data when participants had limited community data. In 
contrast, a quick scan of drug reviews on WebMD shows that many drugs have 
significant community data, suggesting that vitamin supplements may have many 
reviews as well. Thus, evaluating larger sizes of community data may be more 
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useful for a social navigation system for vitamin supplements. Health 
information can change quite quickly, and either recency or trend characteristics 
of community data would likely have an impact on users’ decisions and thus are 
good attributes for evaluation. Finally, expertise certainly plays a role in how 
health information impacts decisions, and hence it is another characteristic of 
community data that could be evaluated for this social navigation system. 
8.2.4 Evaluating Decision Data 
By setting up the experiment using the guidelines discussed above, the 
decision data obtained from the chosen decision points are amenable to the same 
analysis that I performed in the nonprofit choice experiment. Specifically, the 
following analyses can be performed: 
• the type of social influence that community data exerts—informational or 
normative; 
• the strength of social influence that community data exerts when 
different amounts or combinations of information are available; 
• the strength of social influence that community data exerts for different 
choices and any biases that participants have; 
• the effects that characteristics of community data have on participants’ 
decisions. 
8.2.5 Benefits of an Evaluation Framework based on Social Influence 
Existing evaluation techniques for social navigation system includes measuring 
the increase in speed or efficiency that is achieved by when users employ a social 
navigation system (Wexelblat & Maes, 1999), measuring subjective satisfaction 
with community data (Svensson et al., 2001) and recommendations (Cosley et al., 
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2003), measuring the accuracy of recommendations (Herlocker et al., 2004), and 
views or downloads of suggested items (Cosley, Lawrence, & Pennock, 2002). 
The implicit assumption that motivates these evaluation techniques is that 
they are useful for determining the effectiveness of a social navigation system. 
However, they suffer from two distinct weaknesses. First, these techniques record 
measurements that are proxies to the desired measurement, the effectiveness of a 
social navigation system. Recent research argues that more focus is needed on 
the usage of social navigation systems as compared to these proxy measurements 
(Herlocker et al., 2004; McNee, Kapoor et al., 2006; McNee, Riedl, & Konstan, 
2006a; McNee, Riedl et al., 2006b), and I concur with this argument. Another 
weakness of these evaluation techniques is their diversity; because they are quite 
different, the data that they yield cannot be readily compared. 
Evaluating a social navigation system using social influence can address the 
weaknesses of other evaluation techniques. Decision data that measures the 
social influence of a system provides insight into how a system’s community data 
influences users’ decisions, and thus social influence is a more direct measure of 
a system’s impact on users’ decision processes rather than measuring a proxy. 
Evaluating social navigation systems using social influence also affords direct 
comparisons across system functionality, across domains, and even across 
academic disciplines. Measurements of social influence quantify the impact that a 
system’s community data has on users’ decisions using system-independent and 
domain-independent measures, and hence the framework is agnostic with 
respect to how the system captures, aggregates, and displays community data. 
For instance, the social influence of a system that employs simple aggregation 
algorithms such as counting can be compared to the social influence of a system 
that employs collaborative filtering. In addition, social influence measurements 
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can be used to compare user interface features for a social navigation system by 
comparing how different features change the social influence that the system 
exerts on users’ decisions. 
Evaluating social navigation systems using social influence affords comparison 
of social navigation systems across domains. Using an evaluation method based 
on social influence abstracts and standardizes the inputs to users’ decision 
process—available information and community data—and does the same for its 
outputs—the social influence of a system’s community data and factors that 
impact the strength of the influence. Thus, an evaluation method based on social 
influence prescribes collection of the same decision data and similar analyses of 
the decision data for each system. For instance, the social influence of Acumen 
and Bonfire can be compared to the social influence found in the nonprofit choice 
experiment. 
Such comparisons are valuable because there is ongoing debate about when 
and where to employ social navigation systems (Dieberger et al., 2000), but there 
is little guidance beyond case studies about the utility of social navigation systems 
in different domains. An evaluation method using social influence affords 
comparisons of evaluation data across different domains and can help determine 
when and where social navigation systems are most useful. 
A final benefit derived from evaluating the social influence of social navigation 
systems is the opportunity to compare evaluation data of social navigation 
systems and behavioral data from relevant psychological and economic 
experiments. The foundation of this thesis is the claim and supporting arguments 
that the social navigation user experience can be characterized by employing 
relevant perspectives from the behavioral and social sciences. It is logical, then, to 
draw parallels between and compare results from social influence measures of 
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social navigation systems and results from social influence, advice-taking, and 
informational cascade experiments. 
By connecting evaluations of social navigation systems to social influence, 
advice-taking, and informational cascade experiments, there is the potential to 
advance all bodies of research. One benefit for social navigation systems 
researchers is the adoption of techniques from related disciplines to the study of 
social navigation systems; the experimental design in the nonprofit choice 
experiment demonstrates the value in this approach.  
Another potential benefit for social navigation systems researchers is the 
improvement of social navigation systems through the application of findings 
from social influence, advice-taking, and informational cascade experiments. 
Interactive computation affords new and more powerful applications of social 
influence, often via social navigation systems; computation simplifies and 
provides flexibility in all facets of social information usage, from collection to 
aggregation to display. As such, social navigation system designers can draw from 
the results of social influence and informational cascade experiments to enhance 
the utility of social navigation systems. 
Finally, social navigation systems may also be able to provide insights into the 
basic mechanisms of social influence and informational cascades by providing 
behavioral data more quickly, more easily, or in domains or situations that 
psychological and economic experiments cannot easily explore. Thus, there is 
potential for social navigation systems to provide behavioral data for the study of 
basic psychological and economic phenomena. 
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8.2.6 Limitations of an Evaluation Framework based on Social 
Influence 
The limitations of an evaluation framework that measures the social influence 
of social navigation systems center on its inability to identify and collect decision 
data for the decision points that users most often encounter. Recall that the 
objective information and features of community data that users employ when 
making decisions define the space of possible decisions (also see Figure 8.1). 
Thus, while decision data can be collected for any decision points in the decision 
space, the decision data that is most valuable and necessary for accurately 
assessing the impact of a social navigation system cannot be determined via an 
evaluation framework that measures social influence. Hence, a social influence 
evaluation framework cannot, by itself, fully assess the impact of a social 
navigation system. 
The framework can, however, provide insight into what data is needed to 
complement the framework and ultimately foster its success. In particular, 
complementary data that indicates the decisions points that users are most likely 
to encounter can suggest the decision points for which to collect and analyze 
decision data. The key questions that arise when endeavoring to determine the 
most frequently encountered decision points are: 
• what objective information do users typically have when making decisions? 
• what community data are users likely to have when making decisions? 
• what order will users often encounter decision points? 
Addressing these questions will indicate which decision points in the space are 
most frequently encountered; decision data gathered from these points can 
provide a more accurate evaluation of a system than can decision data from other 
points. 
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The distribution of objective information can vary markedly across user 
populations and domains. In end-user digital privacy and security management, 
for instance, the level of information or expertise among users is often uniformly 
low. In contrast, consider a healthcare domain, where there can be a bimodal 
distribution of information between trained healthcare professionals and 
patients. Finally, in the nonprofit giving domain, half of all donors and more than 
60% of large donors report that they consider financial efficiency information an 
important factor when making donation decisions (Princeton Survey Research 
Associates, 2001). The amount of objective information that users possess or 
gather bears on the decision points that users are most likely to encounter. 
Like objective information, the amount of community data available when 
making a decision can vary markedly between domains and will influence the 
decision points that users will encounter most frequently. Analysis from 
Acumen’s deployment shows that community data can often be obtained for the 
most popular websites but is quite difficult to collect from less popular websites; 
this is likely due to the power law distributions found in website popularity 
(Goecks & Mynatt, 2005a). Thus, when power law distributions are present in 
popularity, usage, or viewing habits of a user community, users are likely to find 
that each item has either a significant amount of community data or very little. 
Not all domains exhibit power law distributions; as noted in section 8.2.3, there 
are a limited number of prescription drugs, and hence most drugs have a large 
amount of community data regardless of their relative popularity. End-user 
security management may also have unique community data distributions 
because often users are forced to make decisions about new software or software 
updates. In such cases, there may be limited community data because the item is 
new and thus not many others have interacted with it. 
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So far, this discussion has focused on identifying the decision points that users 
are most likely to encounter given the information distribution and community 
data distribution within a domain for a given point in time. However, it is also 
necessary to consider the trail of decision points that are likely to arise as a 
community of users makes a sequence of choices. This trail will play a role in 
determining both the community data available for any particular decision point 
and, consequently, the subsequent decision point and continuing trail as well. 
Clearly, the process by which a community creates a trail through a decision 
space is quite complex, and only a brief examination of this process is possible in 
this dissertation. 
There are numerous open questions about a trail of decision points. One 
important question is whether early decisions exert more influence that later 
decisions over the trail’s trajectory. A related question concerns the degree to 
which trails can be substantially changed or manipulated by a small group of 
individuals. Lastly, it is important to ask whether a system produces many 
similar trails or whether the trails within a system are more varied and, if so, 
what can explain the variations in a system’s trails. 
In summary, the limitations of evaluating a social navigation system using 
social influence are rooted in its evaluation of particular decisions rather than a 
trail of decisions. To evaluate social influence, it is necessary to identify and 
collect decision data for particular decision points. This decision data is gathered 
without regard to contextual and temporal factors—information distribution, 
community data distribution, and the dynamics between decision points—that 
lead to, follow, and connect decision points along a trail. These factors will dictate 
which decision points users will encounter most often, and hence which decision 
points should be the focus of evaluations. In addition, these contextual and 
temporal factors may impact the decisions themselves. For instance, economic 
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research suggests that people do adapt their use of community data over multiple 
instances but do so only in constrained situations (Hussam, Porter, & Smith, 
2008).  
Ultimately, a more complete evaluation of decisions supported by a social 
navigation system is likely to require pairing the general method for evaluating 
social influence discussed in this chapter with a more dynamic method in which 
authentic community data is employed and sequences of decisions are captured 
and studied. Iterative application of these methods could be used to investigate 
both trails of decisions points and particular decision points and to connect them 




CHAPTER 9  
IMPACT AND FUTURE WORK 
  
I conclude this thesis with a discussion of its impact, and I chart out future 
work that follows the trajectory initiated in this thesis. 
9.1 Impact 
The goal of this thesis is to develop a better understanding of the social 
navigation user experience. Each chapter makes a contribution toward this goal. 
In Chapter 2, I employ a user-centered perspective to identify four challenges 
for improving social navigation systems. These challenges are (a) creating and 
understanding systems for the purpose of supporting the canonical activity in 
social navigation, decision making; (b) applying social navigation systems to 
domains with objective knowledge; (c) understanding how users employ 
community data to make decisions; and (d) evaluating the efficacy of social 
navigation systems. 
Chapter 3 discusses how herding behavior can act as a lens for further 
refinement of these challenges. Herding behavior has occurred in numerous 
social navigation systems and is quite striking, and thus it is has been 
documented in some detail. Herding arises from the decisions that users make 
using knowledge available to them and using a system’s community data. 
Herding suggests that a system’s community data exerts social influence on 
users, and evaluations of herding behavior indicate that herding can lead to 
surprising, suboptimal, and undesirable outcomes both at the individual level 
and the community level. 
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Chapter 4 synthesizes social navigation systems research with research in 
social influence, advice-taking, and informational cascades to develop hypotheses 
about the social navigation user experience. These hypotheses posit that 
community data from a social navigation system exerts informational influence 
on users, that users egocentrically discount community data, that herding in 
social navigation systems can be characterized as informational cascades, and 
that the size and unanimity of the community data correspond to the strength of 
the community data’s influence. These hypotheses comprise the thesis statement 
as well. 
Chapter 5 employs this initial understanding of the social navigation user 
experience to analyze two social navigation systems, Acumen and Bonfire. 
Acumen is a social navigation system that helps end users make privacy 
management decisions, and Bonfire is a social navigation system that helps end 
users make security management decisions. This chapter reflects on the mixed 
results obtained with Acumen and Bonfire and discusses how minimal expertise 
among users and informational cascades present challenges to the successful 
application of social navigation to end-user security and privacy management. 
Chapter 6 describes the design of the nonprofit choice experiment. The goal of 
this experiment was to evaluate the hypotheses about the social navigation user 
experience developed in Chapter 4. I based the experiment’s design on social 
influence and informational cascade experiments, and hence the experiment 
features charitable giving scenarios in which a participant employs both available 
knowledge and community data to decide whether she would make a donation to 
a nonprofit organization. A significant portion of the experiment’s design is 
devoted to identifying decision scenarios that afford evaluation of the hypotheses 
for the social navigation user experience. 
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Chapter 7 discusses results from the nonprofit choice experiment. The 
experiment’s results support the majority of the hypotheses about the social 
navigation user experience and provide mixed evidence for the other hypotheses. 
The results show that the social navigation system’s community data exerted 
informational influence on participants and that the herding in social navigation 
systems can be characterized as informational cascades. The results suggest that 
participants egocentrically discounted community data; however, because the 
experiment was not designed to directly measure egocentric discounting, it is not 
possible to verify this hypothesis. The experiment’s results show that the 
unanimity of the community data is a significant factor in the effect that the 
community data has on participants’ decisions, but that the size of the 
community data was only significant in some instances. Finally, the results 
indicate that participants were skeptical of making a donation in general, and the 
community data was much more influential when reinforcing this skepticism as 
compared to overcoming it. 
Chapters 2 through 7 develop a robust understanding of the social navigation 
user experience, and Chapter 8 discusses the implications of this understanding. 
Broadly, these implications concern improving the design of social navigation 
systems and developing a general framework for evaluating the social influence of 
social navigation systems. The approach to improving social navigation systems 
is grounded in the development of methods to capture, aggregate, and represents 
objective information rather than actions or decisions. A general framework for 
evaluating the social influence of social navigation systems derives from the 
experimental design of the nonprofit choice experiment; this framework 
standardizes the inputs, outputs, and analyzes for social navigation systems. The 
benefits of this framework include comparing social navigation systems within 
and across domains and comparing results from evaluations of social navigation 
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experiments to results from experiments in social influence and informational 
cascades. However, this framework is limited because additional information is 
needed to identify the most frequent or salient decision points for which to collect 
and analyze decision data. This additional information is necessary to ensure that 
the framework provides an accurate assessment of the system’s impact on users’ 
decisions. 
9.2 Future Work: Addressing a Spectrum of Decisions 
One trajectory of future work is an exploration of the decision path that users 
traverse from initial formulation of a question or decision to their final choice. A 
user’s decision path is the series of decisions that he makes from the initial 
question to final decision that is often permanent or quite difficult to reverse. 
Recall that, in the nonprofit choice experiment, users were asked to decide 
whether they would make a donation to a nonprofit organization. This is a final 
decision, and there are often many decisions a user makes before arriving at this 
final decision. Imagine a user has decided that he would like to make a donation 
to an after-school education program; this decision opens up a space of options—
he can donate locally or nationally, to low-income or minority students, to math 
or literacy education—and he must make decisions to navigation this space just to 
arrive at a final decision. 
The conceptualization of a decision path connects the fundamental unit of 
analysis in this thesis—a decision—to the process of navigating, which is central 
to the body of research in social navigation systems. Navigating, then, is the 
process of making repeated decisions in order to arrive at a final decision, and the 
decision path is the sum of those decisions. By defining navigation as a repeated 
decision making, it is likely that the understanding of the social navigation user 
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experience developed in this thesis can be used to better understand the types of 
decisions that users make as they create a decision path. 
One challenging aspect of a decision path is that users often encounter many 
different types of decisions. Decisions may differ based on the number of choices, 
the difficulty in reversing a decision, whether previous decisions impact or bias 
current decisions, whether the decision requires use of objective knowledge, and 
in other ways as well. Cataloging decision types and understanding how different 
social navigation systems and different features of systems support some 
decisions more readily than others would be a significant step forward in the use 
of social navigation systems to support users’ goals. 
9.3 Future Work: Towards Mindful Use of Social Navigation Systems 
This thesis suggests that it is overly simplistic to view a social navigation 
system as a source of additional information to support decision making. Instead, 
this thesis demonstrates that community data from a social navigation system 
often exerts strong influence over users’ decisions, and that this influence can 
lead to surprising outcomes. Community data’s influence is often significant 
enough to cause people to ignore contradictory knowledge or information and 
instead engage in herding behavior. In addition, the influence of community data 
can be non-uniform and counterintuitive. For example, in the nonprofit 
experiment, the community data reinforced participants’ bias against making a 
donation but did not help participants overcome this bias. Ultimately, then, the 
presence of community data led participants to withhold charitable donations 
more often than they otherwise would have. Depending on the perspective taken, 
the impact of community data on nonprofit giving may be considered undesirable 
or detrimental to societal goals. 
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Social navigation systems, then, are not neutral technologies; instead, they 
promote some behaviors and outcomes and mitigate others. This perspective 
runs counter to past research, which argues that social navigation systems enable 
users to shape a digital space and guide future activities (Dieberger et al., 2000; 
Harrison & Dourish, 1996). Furthermore, this past research argues that social 
navigation systems are a blank slate that users shape. In fact, the research in this 
thesis demonstrates that this is not true; the sociotechnical system that 
surrounds a social navigation system plays a significant role in shaping the use of 
the system. Knowledge distribution, community data distribution, decision 
biases, and incentives all influence the use of a social navigation system, and it is 
these factors that often cause a social navigation system to exert unequal impact 
on users’ decisions. Moreover, social navigation systems can amplify social 
influence, and hence they can amplify the unequal impact. Such amplification can 
lead to markedly skewed influence, as was the case on the nonprofit choice 
experiment. 
9.3.1 The Intent and Goals of Social Navigation Systems 
Due to the strong influence of social navigation system on users’ decisions and 
unequal outcomes that arise from that influence, it is useful to draw a parallel 
between social navigation systems and persuasive technologies (Fogg, 1998). A 
persuasive technology is an interactive technology designed with an intent to 
change attitudes or behaviors. Because many computing systems can change 
attitudes or behaviors, the notion of intent is critical to the definition of a 
persuasive technology because it derives from the goal of or purpose for the 
persuasive technology.  
Collaborative computing systems are not traditionally considered to be 
persuasive computing systems; nonetheless, persuasive computing and intent 
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may be a fruitful perspective for social navigation systems. Before deploying a 
social navigation system, it may be useful to identify the system’s intent and the 
metrics for evaluating whether that intent have been accomplished. Explicit focus 
on a system’s intent can help administrators, designers, and other decision 
makers identify (a) what benefits may accrue and what drawback may occur from 
use of a system and (b) which stakeholders benefit and which are harmed from 
use. Identifying and analyzing the benefits and drawbacks for a system can 
inform the design, deployment, and evaluation of a social navigation system.  
Social navigation systems often have many stakeholders, and this is especially 
true of commercial systems. Understanding the benefits and drawbacks of a 
system can promote a discussion about how best to maximize the utility of a 
social navigation system across its stakeholders, and this discussion can lead to 
more informed and mindful use of social navigation systems.  
A first approximation of stakeholders for a social navigation system includes 
its users, its administrator or administrating organization, and organizations that 
may benefit from users’ behavior. Furthermore, a key question to address is 
whether the administrator’s intent conflicts with users’ goals; such conflict can 
make the deployment and use of a social navigation system more difficult. 
Academic researchers have deployed systems such as Footprints (Wexelblat & 
Maes, 1999), Kalas (Svensson et al., 2001), and Movie Lens28 with the intent to 
develop knowledge about how users employ social navigation systems and how 
they can be improved. In these systems, then, administrators’ intent does not 
conflict with users’ goals. 





However, administrators’ intent and users’ goals can conflict in commercially-
operated social navigation systems, such as those present on Amazon29 and the 
website for The New York Times30. Consumers do not pay for access to these 
sites’ community data, and hence administrators’ intent of the social navigation 
systems for these sites likely driven in part by a profit motive. For instance, the 
intent of Amazon’s social navigation systems may be to encourage users to buy 
items; for The New York Times, the intent may be to encourage users to visit and 
read more articles in order to boost advertising revenues. 
For commercially-operated social navigation systems, then, there are 
potentially dual intents: to help users make better decisions and to promote 
particular behaviors or outcomes that benefit the system’s operators. Often these 
intents align: a search engine provides relevant search results and ads to help a 
user find information; users, in turn, are more likely to use the search engine 
repeatedly and click on ads, both of which generate profit for the search engine.  
However, there are also instances where individual goals and company or 
administrators’ intent do not align. For instance, informational cascades 
frequently benefit organizations but not individuals. Organizations profit from 
cascades through the consumption behavior that a cascade drives, but many 
individuals may regret seeing a popular but low-quality movie, donating to a 
trendy nonprofit organization, or partaking in the latest fad diet. 
The divergence of administrators’ intent and user goals for a social navigation 
system is potentially problematic because administrators usually have 
significantly more power than users and because administrators often have a 
profit incentive to leverage that power. An organization can take advantage of 






this power in seemingly benign ways, such as by ignoring cascades or ignoring 
features that would mitigate cascades. Of course, an organization could actively 
promote cascades as well, although this would be a relatively brazen course of 
action31. If the administrating organization chooses to employ a system with the 
intent to maximize profits, it is possible that they will do so at the expense of 
individual and societal goals by allowing or promoting inaccurate informational 
influence and informational cascades. 
The deployment of a social navigation system that leads to outcomes that are not in the 
best interest of individuals or society can occur under more benign circumstances as well. 
Many people assume that social navigation systems are beneficial because they provide 
additional information that is from unbiased sources. The research in this thesis 
demonstrates this is a false assumption, and the lack of an established evaluation 
framework for social navigation systems prevents the assumption from being easily 
disproved. Hence, social navigation systems can be deployed with good intentions yet 
ultimately lead to unexpected or undesirable outcomes. 
9.3.2 Long-term Observation and Oversight of Social Navigation 
Systems 
Because administrators’ intent may conflict with users’ goals, it is useful to 
investigate methods that balance stakeholders’ interests. Balancing interests 
                                                   
 
 
31 It is useful to draw a distinction between the manipulation that the organization controlling 
the social navigation system can perform and the manipulation of the system by entities to 
promote a cascade of a particular product, such as a movie or health supplement. The former type 
of manipulation is my focus and, to the best of my knowledge, has not been previously discussed; 
the latter has been investigated and potentially solved (Resnick & Sami, 2007) 
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includes maintaining incentives for stakeholders to participate but ensuring that 
no one stakeholder can take advantages of other stakeholders. One potential 
method for balancing stakeholder interests centers on long-term observation and 
oversight of social navigation systems. 
Understanding and balancing stakeholder interests likely requires a deep 
knowledge of social navigation systems that researchers do not yet have. In 
particular, the dynamics of social navigation systems are not well understood. 
The research in this thesis investigates decision making for particular points, but 
the evolution of social navigation systems from point to point is complex and not 
well understood. Section 8.2.6 discusses some of the factors that influence the 
evolution of a social navigation system. In particular, to balance stakeholders’ 
interests, data is needed to determine whether the intent of a system is being 
achieved and whether stakeholders’ goals’ are being met. Long-term observation 
and measurement of social navigation systems is likely to provide data that can 
be used to address these questions. 
Finally, a straightforward method to balance stakeholders’ interest is oversight 
by a third party that is independent of the system’s stakeholders. A third party 
could develop standards for social navigation systems and certify social 
navigation systems that abide by these standards. Oversight of financial markets 
is common and a necessary tool to sustain the use and benefit of markets. Many 
social navigation systems are much like markets—they are places where entities 
with potentially conflicting interests interact in such a way to exchange or share 
information or goods. Hence, oversight of social navigation system is a 
potentially reasonable step to ensure that social navigation systems are fair and 
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